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Cooperative Enterprise as an Antimonopoly 
Strategy 
Sandeep Vaheesan* & Nathan Schneider† 
ABSTRACT 
 
After decades of neglect, antitrust is once again a topic of public 
debate. Proponents of reviving antitrust have called for abandoning the 
narrow consumer welfare objective and embracing a broader set of 
objectives. One essential element that has been overlooked thus far is the 
ownership structure of the firm itself. The dominant model of investor-
owned business and associated philosophy of shareholder wealth 
maximization exacerbate the pernicious effects of market power. In 
contrast, cooperative ownership models can mitigate the effects of 
monopoly and oligopoly, as well as advance the interests of consumers, 
workers, small business owners, and citizens. The promotion of fair 
competition among large firms should be paired with support for 
democratic cooperation within firms. 
Antitrust law has had a complicated history and relationship with 
cooperative enterprise. Corporations threatened by cooperatives have used 
the antitrust laws to frustrate the growth of these alternative businesses. To 
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insulate cooperatives from the antitrust threat, Congress has enacted 
exemptions to protect cooperative entities, notably a general immunity for 
farm cooperatives in the 1922 Capper-Volstead Act. As part of an agenda 
to tame corporate monopoly, all three branches of the federal government 
and the states should revisit these ideas and seek to protect and enable the 
cooperative model across the economy. Although protections that farmers 
fought for a century ago may seem obsolete in an era of big-box retail and 
online platforms, matters of ownership design have at least as much 
relevance today and should be a part of the antimonopoly arsenal. 
 
Table of Contents 
 
I.INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 3 
II.THE RELEVANCE OF OWNERSHIP DESIGN ......................................................... 5 
A.   Harms to Consumers ........................................................................ 9 
B.   Harms to Fair Competition............................................................. 11 
C.   Harms to Workers .......................................................................... 12 
D.   Harms to Society ............................................................................ 14 
E.   Appetite for Alternatives ................................................................ 15 
III.COOPERATIVE ADVANTAGES ......................................................................... 16 
A.  Economies of Scale with Less Need for Conglomeration .............. 21 
B.  Worker Independence with Less Vulnerability .............................. 22 
C.  Self-governance with Less Risk of Public Harm ........................... 23 
D.  Network Effects with Less Need for Centralization ...................... 25 
IV.ANTITRUST LAW AND THE COOPERATIVE FORM ........................................... 26 
A.  Co-op Accommodations in Antitrust Law ..................................... 28 
1.  Protection for Agricultural Cooperatives ................................. 28 
2.  Partial Antitrust Exemption for Collective Action by 
Workers .................................................................................... 31 
B.  How Current Antitrust Doctrine Impedes Certain Cooperative 
Forms and Not Others .................................................................... 33 
1.  Bargaining Cooperatives .......................................................... 34 
2.  Production, Distribution, and Retail Cooperatives ................... 36 
V.HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND STATES CAN PROTECT AND 
ENCOURAGE THE GROWTH OF COOPERATIVE BUSINESSES ..................... 39 
A.  Congress: Expand and Refine Capper-Volstead Exemption to 
Cover Cooperatives Outside Agriculture ....................................... 41 
B.  Courts: Synthesize Existing Antitrust Doctrines to Promote 
Growth of Democratically Accountable Cooperatives................... 46 
C.  Federal Antitrust Agencies: Draw a Distinction Between Joint 
Action Among Relatively Powerless Actors and Corporate 
Collusion ........................................................................................ 48 
D.   States: Authorize and Actively Supervise Cooperatives ................ 51 
VI.CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 53 
 
ART 1 - COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2019  4:02 PM 
2019] COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE AS AN ANTIMONOPOLY STRATEGY 3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust is back. In the words of former Acting Assistant Attorney 
General Renata Hesse, “It is, as it was at its inception, the stuff of popular 
imagination.”1 This legal and policy regime, which has been in retreat for 
as long as many of us can remember,2 has regained some of the spirit and 
urgency that led to its early development3—if not yet the legislative 
ingenuity or political will. Democratic Party politicians are taking notice: 
Senator Elizabeth Warren, at first,4 and, subsequently, party leaders whose 
2017 “A Better Deal” document called for “cracking down on corporate 
monopolies.”5 This mood has even taken hold among some Republicans, 
especially the populist wing emboldened by the presidency of Donald 
Trump.6 For example, the Trump administration broke with recent practice 
when it attempted to block the proposed vertical merger of AT&T and 
Time Warner.7 From different points of view and for different reasons, 
 
1. Renata Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Opening Remarks 
at 2016 Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium: And Never the Twain Shall Meet? 
Connecting Popular and Professional Visions for Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 20, 2016), 
available at https://bit.ly/2dwx2qV. 
2. By way of example, the Department of Justice has filed only one monopolization 
suit in the past 20 years. Antitrust Div. Workload Stats. FY 2009 – 2018, 
http://bit.ly/2ZYz0Vr; Antitrust Div. Workload Stats. FY 2000 – 2009, 
http://bit.ly/2KNGHY6. For a review of antitrust law’s historical development and 
changing objectives and rules, see generally Sandeep Vaheesan, The Evolving Populisms 
of Antitrust, 93 NEB. L. REV. 370 (2014). The prevailing consumer welfare model is neither 
consistent with the original motivations of antitrust law nor adequate to address emerging 
concentrations of economic and political power. See John J. Flynn, The Reagan 
Administration’s Antitrust Policy, Original Intent, and the Legislative History of the 
Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 303 (1988). 
3. For instance, Lina Khan published a widely circulated Yale Law Journal note on 
the clout of Amazon and contemporary antitrust law’s blindness to its power. See generally 
Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L. J. 56 (2017). 
4. Mario Trujillo, Warren Targets Amazon, Apple, Google in Anti-Monopoly 
Speech, THE HILL (June 29, 2016, 1:12 PM), https://bit.ly/2JQt3FB. 
5. A Better Deal, SENATE DEMOCRATS, https://bit.ly/2MosdlG (last visited June 1, 
2019). 
6. Former Trump campaign CEO and senior counselor, Steve Bannon, reportedly 
believes major online platforms like Facebook and Google should be regarded as 
monopolistic utilities. See Ryan Grim, Steve Bannon Wants Facebook and Google 
Regulated Like Utilities, THE INTERCEPT (July 27, 2017, 9:31 AM), https://bit.ly/2tH31c8. 
That said, Bannon’s and the Trump administration’s support for antimonopoly policy 
should be treated with deep skepticism. While supporting public utility regulation for tech 
platforms, Bannon also seeks the “deconstruction of the administrative state”—the same 
administrative that would regulate entities like Facebook and Google. See Jon 
Michaels, How Trump Is Dismantling a Pillar of the American State, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 
7, 2017, 8:36 AM), https://bit.ly/2iDkiyQ. 
7. Steven Overly & Josh Gerstein, Trump Administration Sues to Block AT&T-Time 
Warner Merger, POLITICO (Nov. 20, 2017, 8:59 PM), https://politi.co/2zUHbYU. United 
States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (affirming district court’s 
denial of government’s request for preliminary injunction against the merger). The Obama 
administration, in contrast, permitted large vertical consolidations to proceed on the 
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many politicians and public figures are coming to agree with the 
assessment of Nobel-laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz: “America has a 
monopoly problem—and it’s huge.”8 
With this renewed interest in antitrust, citizens, legislators, and 
regulators should consider a full range of ideas and strategies to address 
the economic and political power of large corporations. This Article 
reconsiders one little-discussed component of the antimonopoly tradition 
in the United States and argues for its renewed relevance to help resolve 
the challenges of the present—cooperative enterprise. In addition to the 
structure of markets, citizens and lawmakers recognized a century ago that 
the structure of the firm itself has important economic, political, and social 
ramifications. The architects of antitrust law, under pressure from 
constituents, enacted a series of exemptions and accommodations, mainly 
on behalf of rural economies. By passing exemption and accommodation 
laws, Congress aimed to protect democratically owned and governed 
businesses and collectives from antitrust suits and to support these entities 
as a means of countering the power of monopolistic corporations. These 
principles deserve to be taken at least as seriously today, including for 
applications far beyond their agrarian origins. The promotion of fair 
competition among large firms should be paired with support for 
democratic cooperation within firms. 
Antitrust law and cooperatives (or co-ops) have a long and 
complicated history. Antitrust enforcement, and the threat of enforcement, 
has affected cooperative activity for more than a century. In particular, 
antitrust law’s strict prohibition of horizontal collusion has sometimes 
been an impediment to socially beneficial cooperation among consumers, 
farmers, workers, and other powerless actors. Congress and the courts 
have attempted to accommodate cooperatives under antitrust law. Since 
farmers have been the group of cooperators best organized to promote their 
interests, Congress has principally enacted antitrust exemptions to protect 
agricultural cooperatives.9 Fully-integrated cooperatives, which bring 
independent entities together to create a new product or business, have 
won recognition in the courts. Supreme Court justices have recognized the 
significance of cooperative models in cases regarding entities ranging 
 
condition that they agree to non-discrimination and other behavioral remedies. See, e.g., 
United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 147–48 (D.D.C. 2011); United States 
v. Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., 1:10-cv-00139, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88626 (D.D.C. 
July 30, 2010). Before the AT&T complaint, the federal antitrust enforcers had not sought 
to block a vertical merger in nearly forty years. See generally Fruehauf Corp. v. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979). 
8. Joseph E. Stiglitz, America Has a Monopoly Problem—and It’s Huge, THE 
NATION (Oct. 23, 2017), https://bit.ly/2y3kD3z. 
9. James L. Guth, Farmer Monopolies, Cooperatives, and the Intent of Congress: 
Origins of the Capper-Volstead Act, 56 AGRIC. HIST. 67, 82 (1982). 
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from the Associated Press (“AP”), a co-op of news agencies,10 to Topco, 
a co-op of small grocery stores.11 With the growing political appetite for 
antitrust policy to confront today’s equivalents of the old railroads and 
telegraph networks,12 the rich and complicated history between 
cooperatives and antitrust should be rediscovered and studied.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the competitive and 
social impacts of dominant ownership models and their relevance to 
antitrust concerns. Part II turns to cooperative models and shows how they 
can mitigate the harms of monopoly and advance a broader set of 
economic, political, and social interests than businesses committed to 
shareholder wealth maximization do. Part III reviews the entanglements 
between cooperatives and antitrust law and the historical efforts of 
accommodating cooperatives in the antitrust framework. Part IV presents 
a series of legislative and regulatory ideas on how the cooperative model 
can be protected and promoted across the economy. 
II. THE RELEVANCE OF OWNERSHIP DESIGN 
Business ethicist Marjorie Kelly usefully employs the language of 
“ownership design” and, in turn, distinguishes “extractive” from 
“generative” corporate structures.13 For Kelly, extractive company 
ownership designs are those that seek “maximum physical and financial 
extraction” on behalf of investor-owners.14 “The generative economy,” in 
contrast, “is one whose fundamental architecture tends to create beneficial 
rather than harmful outcomes.”15 Kelly’s characterizations may seem to 
over rely on the eye of the beholder, but Kelly goes on to make a 
 
10. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 50 (1945). 
11. As stated by Justice Thurgood Marshall in the majority opinion: 
Members of the association vary in the degree of market share that they possess 
in their respective areas. The range is from 1.5% to 16%, with the average being 
approximately 6%. While it is difficult to compare these figures with the market 
shares of larger regional and national chains because of the absence in the record 
of accurate statistics for these chains, there is much evidence in the record that 
Topco members are frequently in as strong a competitive position in their 
respective areas as any other chain. The strength of this competitive position is 
due, in some measure, to the success of Topco-brand products. Although only 
10% of the total goods sold by Topco members bear the association’s brand 
names, the profit on these goods is substantial and their very existence has 
improved the competitive potential of Topco members with respect to other large 
and powerful chains. 
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 600 (1972) 
12. Robinson Meyer, How to Fight Amazon (Before You Turn 29), ATLANTIC, 
http://bit.ly/31Dcx0v (last visited June 29, 2018). 
13. MARJORIE KELLY, OWNING OUR FUTURE: THE EMERGING OWNERSHIP 
REVOLUTION 1–18 (2012). 
14. Id. at 11.  
15. Id.  
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compelling case that when company ownership lies with participant-
stakeholders—such as with workers, customers, or mission-driven 
foundations—rather than profit-seeking investors, companies are able to 
engage in more pro-social behaviors and avoid abuses of market power.16 
Kelly’s findings have been echoed in a variety of studies.17 Ownership 
design has been an essential, but often overlooked, ingredient in 
addressing the mounting crisis of corporate consolidation.18 
Advocates of an antitrust renaissance have an ample record of 
evidentiary support. For example, two-thirds of economic sectors in the 
United States economy became more consolidated between 1997 and 
2012.19 Although such concentration alone may not be illegal under the 
current interpretation of antitrust law,20 it is grounds for broader economic 
and political concern. Additionally, rates of firm creation have declined in 
comparison to rates of exit, to the point of convergence.21 The “consumer 
welfare” or “efficiency” regime, which has defined much of the current 
antitrust practice,22 has failed on its own terms. Empirical research has 
 
16. See generally id. 
17. On economic efficiencies, see Svend Albæk & Christian Schultz, On the Relative 
Advantage of Cooperatives, 59 ECON. LETTERS 397, 401 (1998); on member benefit, see  
Petter Molk, The Puzzling Lack of Cooperatives, 88 TUL. L. REV. 899, 941 (2014); on 
stability and productivity, see VIRGINIE PÉROTIN, WHAT DO WE REALLY KNOW ABOUT 
WORKER COOPERATIVES? 20 (2016), available at https://bit.ly/1OpS5TC; on broad-based 
wealth creation, see Joseph Blasi et al., Having a Stake: Evidence and Implications for 
Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership and Profit Sharing, THIRD WAY, 
https://bit.ly/2H536Oo (last updated Feb. 1, 2017). 
18. But see Phillip Longman, The Case for Small-Business Cooperation, WASH. 
MONTHLY (Nov./Dec. 2018), http://bit.ly/2MilgS7. 
19. Too Much of a Good Thing, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), 
https://econ.st/2PEdrYl. 
20. Hesse, supra note 1. Although resolved decisively as yes in recent decades, the 
question of whether dominant firms must engage in exclusionary or predatory conduct to 
violate antimonopoly law has a rich history in U.S. antitrust. Compare United States v. 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (“The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman 
Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and 
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”), with Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945):  
In order to fall within § 2, the monopolist must have both the power to 
monopolize, and the intent to monopolize. To read the passage as demanding any 
“specific,” intent, makes nonsense of it, for no monopolist monopolizes 
unconscious of what he is doing. So here, “Alcoa” meant to keep, and did keep, 
that complete and exclusive hold upon the ingot market with which it started. 
That was to “monopolize” that market, however innocently it otherwise 
proceeded. 
Id. at 432. 
21. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF 
MARKET POWER 5 (2016), available at https://bit.ly/3127SFQ. 
22. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed 
the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”) (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
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shown a strong positive association between market concentration, prices, 
and mark-ups.23 Furthermore, an influential meta-study of merger 
retrospective analyses found price increases and reduction in output in 
approximately 80 percent of cases, along with trends toward decreased 
investment in research and development.24 
Shareholder wealth maximization serves to accelerate 
monopolization of the economy and to supercharge the socially harmful 
consequences of concentrated power. The ideology of “shareholder 
primacy”25 privileges the interests of stockholders, who are 
disproportionately wealthy,26 above those of workers, customers, or the 
general public, and has faced less political challenge in the United States 
than in other developed nations.27 Shareholder primacy often promotes the 
acquisition and exercise of monopoly and oligopoly power because it 
stresses short-term cash flow generation that can support dividends and 
share buybacks.28 Investment banks counsel their clients that consolidation 
tends to boost investor returns.29 Thanks to concentrated market structures, 
corporate profitability and returns to capital investors have been strong.30 
Yet, in addition to the reasons for doubting that consolidation benefits 
consumers, it may have a causal relationship (alongside declining union 
 
ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1 (2010), https://bit.ly/21jA9Tt (“Regardless of how 
enhanced market power likely would be manifested, the Agencies normally evaluate 
mergers based on their impact on customers.”). 
23. See, e.g., Gustavo Grullon et al., Are U.S. Industries Becoming More 
Concentrated?, 23 REV. FIN. 697, 698–99 (2019); Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The 
Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 23687, 2017), https://bit.ly/2ZkbIZl; Bruce A. Blonigen & 
Justin R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency 24 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22750, 2016), 
https://bit.ly/2X9NkMA. 
24. JOHN E. KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A 
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF US POLICY 112–13, 159 (2015). 
25. Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of its Fall, and the 
Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2013). 
26. See Thomas L. Hungerford, Changes in Income Inequality Among U.S. Tax Filers 
between 1991 and 2006: The Role of Wages, Capital Income, and Taxes (2013), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2207372. 
27. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 104–05 (2003). 
28. William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, 92 HARV. BUS. REV. 46–55(Sept. 
2014), available at https://bit.ly/1yd02Ff. 
29. Too Much of a Good Thing, supra note 19; Marc Jarsulic et al., Reviving 
Antitrust: Why Our Economy Needs a Progressive Competition Policy, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (June 29, 2016 at 12:01 A.M.), https://ampr.gs/30Vy7xI; Robert D. Boroujerdi 
et al., Does Consolidation Create Value?, GOLDMAN SACHS (Feb. 12, 2014), 
https://bit.ly/2QGnOc2. 
30. The Problem with Profits,  ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), https://econ.st/2Z6luOS. 
ART 1 - COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2019  4:02 PM 
8 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:1 
density and other factors) with the wage stagnation31 that has beset the 
United States economy since the 1970s.32 Tellingly, when managers at 
investor-owned businesses have sought to share some of their profits with 
workers they have faced backlash from Wall Street.33 In contrast to 
shareholders, other stakeholder groups have a broader set of concerns than 
short-term profit maximization34 and would likely not insist on this 
frenetic consolidation activity.  
Investor motivations for consolidation seem especially evident in the 
case of the online economy’s platform business models—found in 
companies like Google, Amazon, and Facebook—which now constitute 
some of the most valuable entities traded on public markets.35 Rather than 
simply manufacturing a product and selling it to customers, platform 
companies create and control multi-sided markets designed to capture 
entire sectors of the economy.36 Venture-capital financiers, who tend to 
gain ownership and governance rights in such companies at their early 
stages, often expect and demand “exponential” growth, which encourages 
monopolistic behavior.37 Moreover, such platforms rely on “network 
effects” for proper function. A critical mass of users is necessary for the 
platform to function at all, and once that critical mass is achieved, new 
entrants can face insurmountable obstacles to challenging incumbents.38 
Financing strategies, the resulting ownership designs, and network effects 
thus converge to result in firms designed for consolidation on the behalf 
of investor-owners.  
These dominant platforms can offer a wide selection of products at 
low prices and, on the surface, can be congenial to consumers. Some 
platform companies, like Google and Facebook, do not charge for their 
 
31. See Nathan Wilmers, Wage Stagnation and Buyer Power: How Buyer-Supplier 
Relations Affect U.S. Workers’ Wages, 1978 to 2014, 83 AM. SOC. REV. 213, 230–32 
(2018); José Azar et al., Labor Market Concentration 13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 24147, 2019), https://bit.ly/2II7vI7 (noting the relation between market 
concentration and wage stagnation). 
32. Efraim Benmelech et al., Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does 
Employer Concentration Affect Wages? 23–24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 24307, 2018), https://bit.ly/2HnHAqq. 
33. See, e.g., Justin Bachman, American’s CEO Sides with Airline Workers Against 
Wall Street, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2017, 11:29 A.M.), https://bloom.bg/2RkX6X7. 
34. See Stout, supra note 25, at 1171. 
35. See The 100 Largest Companies in the World by Market Value in 2018 (in Billion 
U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://bit.ly/2IDS8AJ (last visited Sep. 6, 2019) 
36. Martin Kenney & John Zysman, The Rise of the Platform Economy, 32 ISSUES 
SCI. & TECH. 61, 61–62 (2016). 
37. See, e.g., Dirk Engel, The Impact of Venture Capital on Firm Growth: An 
Empirical Investigation 7 (ZEW, Disc. Paper No. 02-02, 2002), https://bit.ly/2X8PjRh. 
38. GEOFFREY G. PARKER ET AL., PLATFORM REVOLUTION: HOW NETWORKED 
MARKETS ARE TRANSFORMING THE ECONOMY AND HOW TO MAKE THEM WORK FOR YOU 
60 (2016). 
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core services. But such benefits come with hidden costs—hidden from 
consumers and from an interpretation of antitrust law that looks principally 
to consumer prices rather than other harms that might come from 
overwhelming market power.39 Investor ownership can further exacerbate 
the harms that market power might hold for the common good. 
A.  Harms to Consumers 
Investor-owned businesses often exercise their market power to make 
large short-term profits. Corporations with market power raise prices to 
consumers and bolster their bottom-line. In turn, the profits are often 
disbursed to shareholders in the form of dividends and stock buybacks that 
generate capital gains. This exercise of market power is seen across the 
economy in sectors such as airlines,40 pharmaceuticals,41 and telecom.42 
Health-care is a telling example: highly concentrated local hospital 
markets across the country are a principal driver of increased health care 
costs.43 Market power likely transfers a significant fraction of gross 
domestic product from ordinary consumers to the disproportionately 
affluent executives and shareholders of monopolistic and oligopolistic 
businesses.44 
In addition to this classic exercise of market power, investor-owned 
firms can draw financing as long as they maintain high expectations for 
the future value of their shares. Today, the prospect of monopoly profits 
in the future can be sufficient to attract investors and support a high share 
price. For example, firms might be able to drive competitors out of a 
market with below-cost pricing and raise prices once they face fewer 
competitive constraints.45 This phenomenon seems to be increasingly 
common in the online economy. Highly valued tech platforms like 
Amazon and Uber can operate at a loss while they invest in achieving 
 
39. See generally Charles Duhigg, The Case Against Google, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 
2018), https://nyti.ms/2BDUsWs. 
40. See, e.g., Ying Shen, Market Competition and Market Price: Evidence from 
United/Continental Airline Mergers, 10 ECON. TRANSP. 1, 6 (2017). 
41. See, e.g., ROBIN FELDMAN & EVAN FRONDORF, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA 
RAISES PRICES AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE MARKET (2017).  
42. See, e.g., SUSAN P. CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND 
MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2013). 
43. See, e.g., Zack Cooper et al., The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health 
Spending on the Privately Insured (Nat’l Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 21815, 
2018), https://bit.ly/2KfQbge; Alex R. Horsenstein & Manual S. Santos, Understanding 
Growth Patterns in U.S. Health Care Expenditures, 17 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 284 (2018). 
44. See, e.g., William S. Comanor & Robert H. Smiley, Monopoly and the 
Distribution of Wealth, 89 Q. J. ECON. 177, 194 (1975). 
45. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Reconsidering Brooke Group: Predatory Pricing in Light 
of the Empirical Learning, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 81, 84–94 (2015) (summarizing some 
of the case studies and other empirical research documenting dominant firms’ successful 
use of below-cost pricing). 
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market dominance.46 Consumers experience low or even imperceptible 
costs, so they eagerly participate in this process.  
Increasingly, investors in diverse industries can count on an 
additional source of future returns: consumer data. This data can be sold 
on secondary markets or used to create future products for the company 
itself.47 Consumers may share their data unknowingly or because they 
have no alternative,48 and in many cases the “terms of service” adhesion 
contracts they must agree to immunize companies from the consequences 
of lawbreaking through mechanisms such as mandatory arbitration and 
class-action waivers.49 Furthermore, the unilateral agreements are highly 
malleable and imprecise, granting companies sweeping flexibility in their 
future use of consumers’ data contributions without those consumers’ 
knowledge or explicit consent.50 Public commitments about data practices 
are no less malleable, such as when Facebook reneged on a promise not to 
siphon data from WhatsApp users after purchasing the popular messaging 
app.51 
These investor-owned, data-driven companies carry out a balancing 
act: they must divert consumers’ attention away from the potential uses 
and abuses of the data being collected, while at the same time remind 
investors of the valuable future opportunities that growing market power 
affords. But the scales of this balance are tipped. An investor-owned 
company regards consumers as means to the investors’ ends.52 When the 
 
46. See Khan, supra note 3, at 712. 
47. Id. at 785–86. 
48. JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., THE TRADEOFF FALLACY: HOW MARKETERS ARE 
MISREPRESENTING AMERICAN CONSUMERS AND OPENING THEM UP TO EXPLOITATION 
(2015), available at https://bit.ly/1F4S958. 
49. JAMILA VENTURINI ET AL., TERMS OF SERVICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS 
OF ONLINE PLATFORM CONTRACTS (Flavio Jardim & Cibeli Hirsch trans., 2016). The 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act expansively to permit 
corporations to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses, including class action waivers. See 
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 238–39 (2013); AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011). For a critical analysis of 
contracts of adhesion, see generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE 
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013). 
50. Casey Fiesler et al., Reality and Perception of Copyright Terms of Service for 
Online Content Creation, Conference Report, Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference 
on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing (Feb. 27–Mar. 2, 2016), 
https://bit.ly/2Id6Mjg. See generally TERMS OF SERVICE; DIDN’T READ, https://tosdr.org 
(last visited June 12, 2019). 
51. Mike Isaac & Mark Scott, Relaxing Privacy Vow, WhatsApp Will Share Some 
Data With Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2Hf7utD. 
52. For a comprehensive analysis of how Facebook, Google, and other “surveillance 
capitalists” capture and monetize user behavior to drive targeted advertising business, see 
generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A 
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019). 
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company is forced to choose between those two stakeholder groups’ 
interests, the ownership design predetermines which will prevail. 
B.  Harms to Fair Competition 
The threats to open markets posed by ambitious investors in the age 
of railroads and telegraph lines are exacerbated in the internet economy. 
Data economies, combined with network effects, promise both rewards to 
investors and threats to competition. Many of the most profitable new 
markets (from personalized advertising to artificial intelligence) depend 
on access to vast troves of data. Such data require time, expense, and often 
market power to build in the first place.53 Further, companies like Google, 
Amazon, and Facebook have each become involved in offering utility-
level services (such as cloud computing, undersea cables, and internet 
service provision) that increasingly put pressure on would-be competitors 
to become dependent on them.  
Academic and judicial observers have tended to hold that, despite 
their size, the large platform companies have only a precarious 
dominance.54 They contend that as went MySpace and Friendster so can 
Facebook, but there are reasons to believe that the new dominant, 
networked firms are different from their predecessors. Unlike MySpace 
and Friendster, Facebook, Google, and Amazon have dominated for a 
decade or more and appear more protected from competition than ever.55 
If this is the case, greater market entrenchment rewards those companies’ 
investors, especially when antitrust oversight is blind to their power. The 
dominant model of investor-owned businesses and philosophy of 
shareholder wealth maximization ensure that the interests of executives 
and shareholders will capture the lion’s share of spoils from the pervasive 
market power in the American political economy.56 
The dangers that investor ownership can pose to competition are not 
limited to the data-driven online economy. The structure of capital markets 
invites investor-dominated firms to exceed market expectations at all 
costs. This can lead to socially beneficial behavior, but it can also invite a 
firm to seek market dominance as an end in itself. Growth becomes an 
overriding imperative; more than stability, sustainability, quality products, 
 
53. See Khan, supra note 3, at 785–86. 
54. See, e.g., Justus Haucap & Ulrich Heimeshoff, Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: 
Is the Internet Driving Competition or Market Monopolization?, 11 INT’L ECON. & ECON. 
POL’Y 49, (2014). 
55. See Ethan Chiel, Can Facebook and Google Be Disrupted?, INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 
12, 2017), https://nym.ag/2wNq4p0. 
56. See Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust 
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 234, 239–45 (2017). 
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or other metrics.57 Investment banks likewise tend to view consolidation 
as an advantage.58 Especially in a context of weak or non-existent antitrust 
rules on exclusionary practices, firms can find that predatory behavior is 
cheaper, and more rewarded in capital markets than customer-facing 
competition on product quality or price. The advent of diversified 
investment funds raises another monopoly concern. When a single 
institutional investor holds shares in companies across a given industry, 
the investor may seek to dampen risk-taking and innovation to protect the 
overall portfolio rather than seeking competitive advantage for any one 
firm.59 
To discourage the acquisition and exercise of market power on behalf 
of investors, the investor-owned firm as an organizational structure should 
face competition from other kinds of firms. If investors opt for market 
power over product quality, for instance, other kinds of owners can 
compete on quality. If investors opt to dampen competition across a 
diverse portfolio, firms not owned by investors can stimulate competition 
in their place. 
C.  Harms to Workers 
Growing consolidation has diminished the power and wealth of 
workers and hurt the overall standing of labor. Labor market concentration 
is associated with lower wages, and most local labor markets across the 
country are moderately or highly concentrated.60  Workers in the United 
States have experienced wage stagnation or decline for decades.61 
Meanwhile, workers who were once salaried employees with medical and 
retirement benefits now find themselves working gig-to-gig, without a 
safety net from the companies that direct and manage their work.62 
Millions of Americans struggle to subsist and face financial ruin if an 
emergency strikes.63  
 
57. See generally Myron J. Gordon & Jeffrey S. Rosenthal, Capitalism’s Growth 
Imperative, 27 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 25 (2003).  
58. See Boroujerdi et al., supra note 29. 
59. See ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING 
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 168–204 (2018). 
60. See Benmelech et al., supra note 32, at 23–24; Azar et al., supra note 31, at 17–
18. 
61. See Issue Brief # 330, Lawrence Mishel, The Wedges between Productivity and 
Median Compensation Growth, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 26, 2012), 
https://bit.ly/2wxxD2X. 
62. See TREBOR SCHOLZ, UBERWORKED AND UNDERPAID: HOW WORKERS ARE 
DISRUPTING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 13 (2017). 
63. See FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT ON THE ECON. WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS 
IN 2016 2 (2017), https://bit.ly/2qTwKhw (“Forty-four percent of adults say they either 
could not cover an emergency expense costing $400, or would cover it by selling something 
or borrowing money . . . .”). 
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The largest firms whose business occurs primarily online have used 
their market power in ways that show little sign of reversing such trends. 
On the one hand, large online companies frequently pay their skilled 
employees generous salaries and employee stock-purchase plans are 
almost commonplace, enabling salaried workers to enjoy the rewards of 
investor ownership.64 On the other hand, large online companies employ 
far fewer salaried employees than the largest industrial corporations of 
earlier generations did—just thousands or tens of thousands, compared to 
hundreds of thousands in companies like General Motors and General 
Electric.65  
Today, both new and old corporations rely more on non-employee 
workers and free labor. Online platforms in particular depend on a large 
number of non-employee contributors of work—from Uber drivers to 
users posting creative content to Facebook. If paid for their services, these 
contributors are regarded as contractors and receive less in wages and 
benefits and have fewer rights than workers of the past could expect from 
such economic giants.66 The arrangement between platforms and non-
employee contractors is one that investors have come to expect and, often 
times, encourage.67 Such expectations have encouraged many older 
companies to reduce the number of employees on their payroll and 
outsource core functions to contractors who use contingent employment 
arrangements.68 The commonplace suits filed by workers for being 
misclassified as contractors suggest that this phenomenon is driven 
primarily by the investor-owners of the hiring firms, not by workers 
themselves.  
 
64. See James C. Sesil et al., Broad-based Employee Stock Options in U.S. ‘New 
Economy’ Firms, 40 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 273, 275–78 (2002). 
65. See Alexis C. Madrigal, Silicon Valley’s Big Three vs. Detroit’s Golden-Age Big 
Three, THE ATLANTIC (May 24, 2017), https://bit.ly/2qd3pBE. 
66. See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google’s Shadow Work Force: Temps Who 
Outnumber Full-Time Employees, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/technology/google-temp-
workers.html?searchResultPosition=2&module=inline. 
67. See generally Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital 
Transformation of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577 (2016). 
68. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR 
SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 83–87 (2014). Revisions to antitrust 
laws contributed to the group of the fissured workplace in which contractors and 
specialized independent firms perform the core functions of a corporation. Beginning in 
the late 1970s, the relaxation of antitrust rules governing vertical restraints (between firms 
in connected markets) allowed businesses, like fast food franchisors, to exercise control 
over those formally outside their corporate roof, like franchisees. See generally Brian 
Callaci, Vertical Restraints and the Creation of a Fissured Workplace: Evidence from 
Franchise Contracts (2018).  
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D.  Harms to Society 
In addition to suppressing potential rivals and diminishing worker 
leverage, the combination of investor-ownership with market 
concentration results in reduced opportunity throughout society. Although 
stock ownership is, in principle, universally accessible, in practice such 
ownership and the capital gains resulting from it are highly concentrated—
and increasingly so.69 Under such conditions, investor-owned firms with 
durable market power contribute to widening wealth inequality, which in 
turn can reduce the prospects for individual economic mobility.70 
When combined with pervasive market power, the shareholder value 
maximization ideology can also imperil long-term economic development 
and prosperity. Monopoly and oligopoly power reduce companies’ 
incentive to develop new capacities and can make long-term investment a 
losing proposition.71 Instead, the safer approach would be extracting as 
much profit from existing capacity. Furthermore, shareholder-centric 
management philosophy has engendered an extreme short-termism across 
much of the business sector. Many companies and their managements seek 
to generate as much short-term capital gains and dividends as possible.72 
As a result, they often forgo investments that have longer-term payoffs. 
This short-termism can have serious effects on long-term economic 
growth and standards of living.73 Private equity-owned businesses 
exemplify this shareholder value maximization in action. Under private 
equity ownership, businesses routinely borrow substantial amounts of 
 
69. See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States 
Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q. J. ECON. 519, 530–31 
(2016); Jeanna Smialek, Stock Ownership Flashes a Warning Signal for Wealth Inequality, 
BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2017, 8:28 A.M.), https://bloom.bg/2rBgQeQ. 
70. See Janet L. Yellen, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech 
at the Conference on Economic Opportunity and Inequality: Perspectives on Inequality and 
Opportunity from the Survey of Consumer Finances (Oct. 17, 2014), available at 
https://bit.ly/ZHI0OS. 
71. See America’s Uncompetitive Markets Harm Its Economy, ECONOMIST (July 27, 
2017), https://econ.st/2WIxokb. During a strike by Verizon workers in 2015, a 
commentator compared and contrasted the company’s relationship with shareholders to its 
relationship with workers:   
There’s a lot of attention on the Verizon strike, but less attention to Verizon’s 
payouts to shareholders. Verizon did a $5 billion stock buyback last year to boost 
its stock price, on top of an already generous dividend. If that money had instead 
been divided among 180,000 workers, it would have come to $28,000 per person 
— showing that there’s plenty of profit to be shared across the company. Or, if 
it costs $500 to install FiOS in one household, that money could have been used 
to help 10 million households cross the digital divide. 
Mike Konczal, How the Rise of Finance Has Warped Our Values, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 
2016), https://wapo.st/315v4D7. 
72. See Lazonick, supra note 28. 
73. See Karen Brettell et al., The Cannibalized Company, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2015), 
https://reut.rs/2vo0pSJ . 
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money to pay generous dividends to their owners and cripple their long-
term financial viability in the process.74  
Widening inequality and labor disruption are just a few of the public 
harms produced by the combination of market power with investor-
focused ownership designs. Investor-owned companies, for instance, have 
difficulty addressing environmental considerations head-on. After 
revelations that ExxonMobil executives had knowingly misled the public 
on climate change for many years, shareholders had standing to sue the 
company, not for ecological damage, but merely for related losses in the 
value of their shares.75 Due to a series of court decisions across a range of 
areas, investor-owned businesses face few constraints on their political 
activities and can advance their short-term business interests at the 
expense of more multifarious perceptions of the common good.76 
E.  Appetite for Alternatives 
Despite the prevalence of investor-owned firms in the Fortune 500, 
this model of ownership faces growing protest and criticism from 
commentators and in the business world itself. Some scholars perceive that 
shareholder primacy is on the decline.77 Management schools that once 
held this ideology as gospel have begun teaching competing notions such 
as the “triple bottom line” and “social entrepreneurship.”78 Companies 
have found that they can gain trust and loyalty of customers by pursuing 
the relatively recent B Corp charter, which incorporates an entity as a 
benefit corporation.  A growing number of states are allowing B Corp 
charters and legally allowing a company’s managers to prioritize social 
 
74. See Nabila Ahmed & Sridhar Natarajan, Private Equity Wins Even When It Loses, 
Thanks to Debt Markets, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 2017, 5:00 A.M.), 
https://bloom.bg/2ndpQnk. 
75. See Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, What Exxon Mobil Didn’t Say About 
Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2v4LBLp. 
76. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (“[T]o 
exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of the modern free 
economy. We should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this speech to the public 
debate.”); Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379–80 (1991) 
(“The federal antitrust laws also do not regulate the conduct of private individuals in 
seeking anticompetitive action from the government. . . .  That a private party’s political 
motives are selfish is irrelevant: Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to 
influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in 
Eroding “We the People’s” Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C. 
R.-C. L. L. REV. 423 (2016). 
77. See Stout, supra note 25, at 1178–81. 
78. Gerald F. Davis & Christopher White, The Traits of Socially Innovative 
Companies, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 17, 2015), https://bit.ly/1HhsdYU; see also Ana María 
Peredoa & Murdith McLean, Social Entrepreneurship: A Critical Review of the Concept, 
41 J. WORLD BUS. 56, 56 (2006). 
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mission over profit maximization.79 Some entrepreneurs have sought to 
abandon conventional corporate structures altogether with “distributed 
autonomous organizations” and the like, which are enabled by the 
blockchain technology underlying Bitcoin. To be sure, in many cases, 
these systems have been used to merely replicate under-regulated 
speculative markets.80 
Part of this experimentation has been a revival of interest in 
cooperative business structures. Since the 2008 financial crisis, there has 
been a surge of interest in “move your money” campaigns preferring credit 
unions over investor-owned banks, policy initiatives on behalf of worker-
owned businesses, and a phenomenon known as “platform 
cooperativism”—a marriage of cooperative ownership designs with the 
platform economy which has spawned conferences, startups, policy 
initiatives, and more.81 While such efforts have tended to strike a utopian 
chord, the cooperative model is arguably the oldest and most well-proven 
form of social enterprise. The cooperative model represents a tradition that 
also bears neglected significance for antitrust. 
III. COOPERATIVE ADVANTAGES 
A cooperative is a business or other collective owned and governed 
by the people or organizations that benefit from its product, service, or 
employment, rather than by outside investors seeking solely financial 
return. Though it is common today to regard cooperatives as an 
“alternative” kind of corporation, Henry Hansmann’s seminal study, The 
Ownership of Enterprise, reverses the relation by describing the primarily 
investor-owned (or “capitalist”) corporation as “the most familiar form of 
producer cooperative.”82 Hansmann considers the cooperative a general 
rubric of joint ownership and governance, under which capitalist 
corporations are a subset that happens to grant particular privilege to 
capital-contributors (as opposed to other stakeholders such as employees, 
 
79. See Janine S. Hiller, The Benefit Corporation and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 118 J. BUS. ETHICS 287, 288 (2012). For an example of conflict between 
investor-ownership and a cousin of B Corp incorporation, B Corp certification, see David 
Gelles, Inside the Revolution at Etsy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2n1PGfy. 
80. See generally PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE 
LAW: THE RULE OF CODE (2018). 
81. See generally TREBOR SCHOLZ & NATHAN SCHNEIDER, OURS TO HACK AND TO 
OWN: THE RISE OF PLATFORM COOPERATIVISM, A NEW VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF WORK 
AND A FAIRER INTERNET (Trebor Scholz & Nathan Schneider eds., 2016); Nathan 
Schneider, An Internet of ownership: Democratic design for the online economy, 66 SOC. 
REV. 320 (2018) [hereinafter An Internet of Ownership]; NATHAN SCHNEIDER, EVERYTHING 
FOR EVERYONE: THE RADICAL TRADITION THAT IS SHAPING THE NEXT ECONOMY 82–83  
(2018) [hereinafter EVERYTHING FOR EVERYONE]. 
82. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE ix (1996). 
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customers, or suppliers).83 Cooperative scholars tend to consider this an 
over-simplification, since the cooperative “movement” asserts principles 
and values over and above merely a shared ownership structure.84  
Cooperative businesses arose in tandem with the advent of the 
industrial firm. Textile mill workers in Rochdale, England founded a 
customer-owned store, widely regarded as the first modern co-op in the 
Anglophone world, in 1844. In the subsequent decades, this model was 
replicated widely and spawned a national wholesale purchasing and 
manufacturing co-op whose descendant, the Co-operative Group, remains 
an important British retailer today.85 In the nineteenth century United 
States, cooperatives were among the first to establish the insurance 
industry (in which major firms such as State Farm and Northwestern 
Mutual are still owned by their policyholders) and were instrumental in 
modernizing agriculture (through joint purchasing and marketing 
efforts).86 By the early twentieth century, the U.S. federal government 
actively supported co-op development, especially under the purview of the 
Department of Agriculture. Cooperative brands include grocery store 
staples such as Land O’Lakes butter, Organic Valley milk, Ocean Spray 
cranberries, and Sun-Kist oranges.87 Less visible on retail shelves, but 
nonetheless significant, is CHS, a Fortune 500 farm supply and marketing 
firm.88 Additionally, CoBank, a product of the Farm Credit System 
established by Congress in 1916, is one of several large agricultural banks 
whose member-owners are the co-ops with which they do business.89  
The phenomenon of smaller businesses doing joint purchasing or 
marketing through cooperative firms is by no means limited to agriculture. 
Familiar examples include, for instance, hardware purchasing 
 
83. See id. 
84. See Sonja Novkovic, Defining the Cooperative Difference, 37 J. SOCIO-
ECONOMICS 2168, 2175 (2008). 
85. See JOHN F. WILSON ET AL., BUILDING CO-OPERATION: A BUSINESS HISTORY OF 
THE CO-OPERATIVE GROUP, 1863–2013 (2013). 
86. See generally JOHN CURL, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN 
HISTORY OF COOPERATION, COOPERATIVE MOVEMENTS, AND COMMUNALISM IN AMERICA 
(2012); JESSICA GORDON NEMBHARD, COLLECTIVE COURAGE: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN 
AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE (2014); JOSEPH G. KNAPP, 
THE RISE OF AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE: 1620–1920 (1969); EDWARD K. SPANN, 
BROTHERLY TOMORROWS: MOVEMENTS FOR A COOPERATIVE SOCIETY IN AMERICA, 1820–
1920 (1989). 
87. See Co-ops Commit: The 2017 NCB Co-op 100, NAT’L COOPERATIVE BANK, 
https://bit.ly/31vocz5 (last visited July 15, 2019). 
88. See CHS Financials and News, FORTUNE, https://bit.ly/2WCMd7S (last visited 
Sep. 6, 2019). 
89. See Corporate, COBANK, https://bit.ly/2XiShiV (last visited July 15, 2019). 
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cooperatives such as Ace and, until recently, True Value.90 These co-ops 
have helped ensure the survival of many locally owned hardware stores, 
which in turn are member-owners of the co-ops.91 Some retail franchises, 
such as Dairy Queen and Best Western, have co-ops built into their 
franchise structures.92 
Cooperatives with individual consumers as members have also 
created sustainable enterprises and achieved economies of scale. During 
the interwar years, farmers lacking access to electricity began to form their 
own electric utility co-ops. In 1936 the Rural Electrification Act granted 
low-interest federal loans and technical assistance that spurred the creation 
of what are now nearly 900 such utilities, which provide power for more 
than half of the United States landmass and increasingly offer broadband 
internet as well.93 Meanwhile, department store mogul Edward Filene 
coined the term “credit union” for customer-owned, co-op retail banking 
and he advocated for the passage of enabling legislation.94 Credit unions 
provide consumer-owned banking services for many millions of people, 
both rural and urban, sometimes out-competing far larger banks on certain 
products.95 Consumer-owned retail stores have also been essential for 
developing new markets, such as for high-end sporting goods—consider 
REI or Canada’s Mountain Equipment Co-operative—and the natural 
foods co-ops that paved the way for the Amazon-owned giant Whole 
Foods.96 Other countries have even more significant examples of retail 
cooperation, such as Italy’s Coop Italia, a federation of regional consumer 
cooperatives that constitutes the country’s largest grocery chain.97 
Worldwide, approximately three million cooperatives reportedly 
account for about 10 percent of all employment.98 A recent survey of the 
 
90. See Lauren Zumbach, True Value Owners Approve Selling Majority Stake in 
Hardware Co-op to Private Equity Firm, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 20, 2018, 12:05 P.M.), 
https://bit.ly/2QBbgTz. 
91. See generally William P. Darrow et al., David vs. Goliath in the Hardware 
Industry: Generic Strategies and Critical Success Factors as Revealed by Business 
Practice, 37 MID-ATLANTIC J. BUS. 97 (2001). 
92. See, e.g., About, DQOA/DQOC, https://bit.ly/2YWPZGP (last visited July 15, 
2019); see also Quist v. Best Western Int., Inc., 354 N.W.2d 656, 659 (N.D. 1984). 
93. See Nathan Schneider, Economic Democracy and the Billion-Dollar Co-op, THE 
NATION (May 8, 2017), https://bit.ly/2pdtwYL. 
94. See generally CARROLL MOODY & GILBERT C. FITE, THE CREDIT UNION 
MOVEMENT: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, 1850–1980 (1984). 
95. See JOHN TATOM, Competitive Advantage: A Study of the Federal Tax Exemption 
for Credit Unions (2006). 
96. See Ruth Little et al., Collective Purchase: Moving Local and Organic Foods 
beyond the Niche Market, 42 ENV’T & PLAN. A: ECON. & SPACE 1797, 1800–02 (2010). 
97. See Paul W. Dobson et al., The Patterns and Implications of Increasing 
Concentration in European Food Retailing, 54 J. AG. ECON. 111, 116 (2003). 
98. See Facts and Figures, INT’L CO-OPERATIVE ALLIANCE, https://bit.ly/2GfUV04 
(last visited July 15, 2019). 
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co-op sector in the United States counted nearly 40,000 businesses 
employing over 600,000 people.99 These businesses include co-ops owned 
by their workers, their small-business clients, their individual customers, 
and more. Some include in their ownership structure several types of 
stakeholder classes. Additionally, as many as 14 million workers 
participate in employee stock-ownership plans, which bear some 
resemblance to cooperatives.100 Since co-ops take such different forms, it 
is a flexible business structure that allows for diverse “bottom lines” in 
lieu of the shareholder value that motivates typical investor-owned firms. 
Research suggests a similarly diverse set of social benefits, including 
contributions to community governance,101 protection against 
exploitation,102 and resilience in times of economic hardship.103 
Despite their advantages, cooperatives face certain challenges. In 
times past, people might have pooled their resources in a co-op to 
circumvent the high costs of capital, or outright barriers to capital access. 
In societies where finance plays a growing role and captures a larger share 
of the economy,104 the cost of investor capital for new enterprises may be 
so low that democratic self-organizing is seen as expensive in comparison 
to investor ownership. Although cooperative financing mechanisms are 
widespread in certain sectors (such as agriculture and electric utilities) 
they are almost nonexistent in others (such as software and 
manufacturing). Historically, success in overcoming such barriers has 
tended to come through a blend of entrepreneurship and policy support.105 
Cooperatives can also struggle with costly and ineffective 
governance, especially when they endure shifts in scale or member culture 
that the founders failed to anticipate.106 This is one reason why co-ops 
frequently depend on regional, national, and international associations to 
 
99. See Measuring the Cooperative Economy, U. WIS. CTR. FOR COOPERATIVES, 
https://mce.uwcc.wisc.edu (last visited July 15, 2019). 
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establish standards, best practices, and member-training regimes, as well 
as to exert pressure in cases of stagnation or mismanagement.107 In 
addition to such more or less voluntary associations, legal regimes have 
also played a role in establishing and enforcing standards for cooperative 
firms. 
The International Co-operative Alliance, which represents the co-op 
sector globally, maintains an official definition, seven principles and six 
values, that it regards as constituting “cooperative identity,” last updated 
in 1995.108 In the United States, as with other features of corporate law, 
co-op incorporation statutes vary state-by-state. The United States 
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) has provided a far more concise, 
three-point definition:109 
 User-Owner Principle: Those who own and finance the 
cooperative are those who use the cooperative. 
 User-Control Principle: Those who control the cooperative are 
those who use the cooperative. 
 User-Benefits Principle: The cooperative’s sole purpose is to 
provide and distribute benefits to its users on the basis of their use. 
The “user” in question can be a consumer, farmer, worker, another 
co-op, or another kind of business. Although many co-ops overseen by the 
USDA have become increasingly consolidated,110 these principles 
nevertheless amount to a kind of ownership design quite distinct from 
ownership by investors seeking only higher share prices and dividends. 
This distinctiveness can have consequences for antitrust policy. 
The 1922 Capper-Volstead Act, sometimes known as the “Magna 
Carta of cooperatives,” provided farmers with some protection from 
antitrust laws that might otherwise target their co-ops.111 According to its 
sponsor, Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas, the act’s purpose was “to give 
to the farmer the same right to bargain collectively that [was]already 
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(April 2017), https://bit.ly/2kMwgLn. 
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enjoyed by corporations.”112 This rationale reflects the assumption that, 
with respect to antitrust policy, a group of small producers organizing 
together in a cooperative business should be treated differently from other 
kinds of corporations. This insight is no less relevant today. 
A. Economies of Scale with Less Need for Conglomeration 
One significant difference between cooperatives and investor-owned 
businesses lies in how they tend to achieve scale: through federation rather 
than conglomeration. Large cooperatives are usually composed of, and 
accountable to, smaller co-ops or other kinds of businesses. Thus, large 
co-ops incline toward supporting diverse, competitive, smaller enterprises, 
rather than seeking to undercut, eliminate, or absorb them. For instance, 
the regional component co-ops of Coop Italia are not subsidiaries of the 
national company; instead, they own it.113 Most United States electric co-
ops do something similar. On a regional basis, they have formed larger 
“generation and transmission” co-ops, owned by the smaller ones, to 
undertake major capital investments like power plants and high-voltage 
transmission lines.114 Nationally, electric co-ops have formed cooperatives 
for shared financing and technology needs.115 Regional grocery and 
agricultural co-ops likewise achieve national economies of scale through 
such federations. 
Although federations can create market power, they are not likely to 
seek and exercise market power in the same way that investor-owned 
corporations do. Accountability in a cooperative federation flows 
downward, toward participant enterprises or individuals rather than to 
outside investors. In some cases the constituent members are non-
competitive natural monopolies, such as the electric utility co-ops. In other 
cases, cooperative arrangements enable and support member businesses 
that compete with one another. Neighboring farmers, retail stores, or 
service contractors may belong to the same co-op in order to achieve 
economies of scale in discrete activities and, at the same time, continue 
competing for employees, customers, and productivity.116 Thus, 
cooperative federation can present lower risk of anticompetitive and other 
unfair conduct than corporate conglomeration. Evidence also suggests that 
cooperatives can reach higher rates of productivity and efficiency than 
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investor-owned competitors,117 and thereby create savings that are 
designed to be passed on to their members. 
B. Worker Independence with Less Vulnerability 
Labor organizing and cooperatives have a long history together in the 
United States. From the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries, 
workers seeking rights and benefits on the job frequently combined union 
strategies (such as strikes) with co-op strategies (such as forming worker-
owned manufacturing, insurance, housing, and retail businesses).118 For 
instance, co-op stores enabled workers to obtain necessary goods at lower 
prices and co-op workshops allowed workers to earn income in the case of 
a strike. In addition to higher wages, shorter hours, and greater 
employment stability, workers often fought for collective control of the 
workplace.119 National unions such as the Knights of Labor and the 
Industrial Workers of the World actively pursued cooperative 
development when they were most active.120 This pattern largely ceased 
after the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which regularized labor 
disputes in a way that left little room for the creative alternative-building 
that cooperative development represented.  
In the United States and Europe, interest in co-ops has re-emerged 
among workers facing greater vulnerability in the erosion of the postwar 
social contract.121 Unions such as the Service Employees International 
Union and United Steelworkers, among others, have pursued co-op 
development.122 Some of the most promising developments, though, are 
taking place among the contract workers not ordinarily served by labor 
unions. Notably, SMart is a Belgian cooperative (now spreading across 
Europe and beyond) that enables its tens of thousands of active members 
to carry out their freelance payroll and bookkeeping as employees of the 
co-op, granting them access to a more robust social safety network than 
they otherwise would have.123 The New York-based Freelancers Union is 
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not a cooperative (nor a union), but it has recreated features of past worker-
supporting co-ops by providing access to medical insurance and other 
services, together with lobbying and a smartphone app for those seeking 
legal advice.124 A variety of platform cooperatives, such as the gig-
marketplace Loconomics and the home-cleaning app Up & Go, have also 
sought to use shared ownership as a means of taming and improving the 
quality of life possible under irregular employment conditions.125 
Whereas an investor-owned firm may have strong incentives to subjugate 
worker well-being to opportunities for shareholder value, cooperative firms can 
prioritize outcomes for workers as an end in itself—especially when the firm is a 
worker-owned cooperative. In some cases, this can take the form of merely 
dulling some of the more pernicious effects of less stable, predictable, and 
rewarding work arrangements. But shared ownership can also enable workers to 
propose and practice their own visions for the unfolding process that has come to 
be called “the future of work.”  
C. Self-governance with Less Risk of Public Harm 
With or without internal competition, cooperative forms of 
association can mitigate other harms that arise from concentrated 
corporate power. One example is in the potential for self-regulation. While 
investor-owned companies carry strong incentives to prioritize (often 
short-term) share value above other concerns, cooperatives’ participant 
members tend to have a wider range of concerns that boards and managers 
must address. This can introduce dynamism and reduce the need for 
outside regulation to prevent harm to parties outside of the cooperative. 
Co-op participants are more likely to feel the effects of such harms, and 
seek to prevent them, than profit-seeking investors. Such self-regulation 
in cooperatives has already been recognized by policymakers. Electric 
utility co-ops, for instance, operate with less regulation in most states 
relative to investor-owned utilities.126  
Democratically owned and managed enterprises may require less 
extensive public regulation than investor-owned firms, and the benefits 
may outweigh the costs of more diverse stakeholder interests. In cases 
such as the resilience of credit unions after the 2008 financial crisis, 
cooperative governance has shown an ability to accommodate a diverse 
set of priorities.127 Cooperatives can also come to operate as democratic 
and complementary “governing institutions” alongside the public 
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sector.128 These kinds of enterprises, when functioning properly, respond 
to a wide range of community needs and concerns and enable regulators 
to focus on proactive collective-action challenges.  
Furthermore, through market participation, cooperative enterprise 
can compete directly with investor-owned businesses and perform an 
indirect, but important, regulatory function. Through this head-to-head 
rivalry with corporate entities, co-ops can provide beneficial “yardstick 
competition” and push prices closer to what a competitive market would 
yield.129 American history reveals the value of this type of competition. 
During the 1930s, the federal government’s promotion of power projects, 
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, and rural electric cooperatives 
provided critical competition to investor-owned utilities and yielded more 
affordable electric rates.130 
The governance issues facing cooperatives, however, should not be 
discounted. Although electric co-op customer satisfaction is consistently 
higher than for investor-owned electric companies,131 member 
participation in governance is almost universally low—nearly two-thirds 
of electric co-ops receive ballots from less than 10 percent of members in 
board elections.132 These utilities have also faced accusations of racial 
discrimination and disenfranchisement.133 Electric cooperatives are just 
one example of how large, longstanding cooperatives can fall into danger 
of becoming highly centralized and unresponsive to members.134 This 
danger can lead to operational inefficiency, abusive labor practices, and 
even outright self-dealing among managers.135  
A cooperative-oriented economy will require more robust oversight 
to ensure that cooperatives adhere to high standards of accountability and 
are run along democratic lines. Such an economy will also demand a blend 
of legislation, regulation, and voluntary associations. Some countries, like 
Kenya, rely on strong national regulations to oversee cooperative 
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behavior,136 while others, like Italy, have employed the co-ops’ 
associations themselves to enforce good management practices.137 
D. Network Effects with Less Need for Centralization 
The capacity of cooperative models to mitigate the potential harms 
of market concentration may be especially relevant in networked, internet-
enabled economies. Network effects create conditions that can resemble 
natural monopoly in sectors ranging from social media and online retail to 
operating systems and cloud services.138 Users may benefit from ubiquity, 
especially when they are not directly exposed to costs such as data 
surveillance and high barriers of entry for startup competitors. Cooperative 
ownership models could deliver the benefits while mitigating the harms of 
network effects, especially by eliminating the temptation to leverage user 
data on behalf of returns for outside investors. Federation could enable 
large-scale networks, while user ownership would help ensure that such 
networks remain accountable to the people who contribute to them. 
Forms of cooperation have already been remarkably present on the 
internet, in cases such as corporations and individuals jointly producing 
open-source software, or standards-setting organizations, like the World 
Wide Web Consortium, that orchestrate infrastructure among a variety of 
stakeholders.139 These rationales could be extended to companies 
themselves. If certain core Facebook or Amazon services were 
reorganized cooperatively, a startup could participate in those services as 
a full partner, not as a mere client and potential competitor. Just as people 
interact over email using various software and providers, competing 
companies might offer access to the Facebook or Amazon networks with 
a wider range of terms and options. Indeed, the internet is a federated 
network of servers and clients, suggesting that federated, cooperative 
business models might be especially well suited to its economies.140 
In the past, political will and policy have recognized that cooperative 
models merit a distinct kind of treatment under antitrust law. When co-ops 
do gain market power, it will likely be exercised in a different way than 
the way investor-owned firms exercise such power. At a time when 
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concentrated market power is a matter of growing public concern, and 
public opinion is turning back to antitrust enthusiasm, the place of 
cooperative models in the antitrust tradition should be part of the 
conversation as well. The remainder of this Article will consider the legal 
specifics of the cooperative model legacy and some opportunities for 
reviving it to meet the challenges of the present. 
IV. ANTITRUST LAW AND THE COOPERATIVE FORM 
Antitrust law has a complicated relationship and history with 
cooperatives. Certain types of cooperatives exist uneasily in today’s 
antitrust landscape, while others face minimal danger from the antitrust 
laws. Co-ops that seek only to enhance members’ bargaining power may 
encounter serious antitrust risk. In contrast, co-ops that pool the resources 
of members to engage in production, distribution, or retail activities will 
not likely confront greater antitrust risks than investor-owned businesses. 
Because of the serious threat antitrust poses to certain forms of 
cooperatives, Congress has established discrete antitrust immunities for 
cooperatives and other collectives composed of particular classes of 
members. 
Antitrust law today features a default rule that all market 
participants—large businesses, small businesses, workers, and 
consumers—are subject to the same antitrust duties and prohibitions.141 
Judicial and statutory exemptions immunize certain actors from antitrust 
liability.142 These exemptions, however, are the exception rather than the 
rule. The Supreme Court has described the antitrust laws as embodying 
the “fundamental national values of free enterprise and economic 
competition.”143 
Federal antitrust enforcers and courts treat horizontal collusion 
between otherwise competing actors as the most serious antitrust offense. 
Even as the Supreme Court has relaxed legal rules governing a range of 
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competitively suspect business conduct,144 the Court continues to treat 
collusion as per se illegal, condemning it as “the supreme evil of 
antitrust.”145 The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) devotes the 
bulk of its enforcement resources to prosecuting individuals and 
businesses for price-fixing, market division, and other types of “naked 
collusion.”146 Each year, the DOJ obtains prison sentences for numerous 
individuals for cartel activity and collects hundreds of millions of dollars 
in fines.147 Antitrust enforcers subscribe to a bipartisan consensus that 
rooting out collusion should be the most important priority for public 
antitrust.148  
The vehicle through which collusion takes place—whether a 
specially created corporation or something more informal—cannot 
redeem an otherwise illegal price-fixing arrangement.149 The courts have 
long held that “an otherwise naked [and per se illegal] trade restraint 
cannot be made legal just by incorporating it.”150 Drawing on this 
precedent, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborators Among Competitors, 
from the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), have affirmed 
that they likely will challenge joint action without economic integration as 
per se illegal conduct.151 
 
144. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 
(2007) (overruling the nearly century-old per se prohibition on resale price maintenance 
and holding this practice should be evaluated under the rule of reason); Brooke Grp. Ltd. 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24 (1993) (holding that 
predatory pricing claim requires showing of both below-cost pricing and dangerous 
probability of recoupment of below-cost pricing). 
145. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 
398, 408 (2004). 
146. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, WORKLOAD STATISTICS (FY 2008-2017 
5–7), https://bit.ly/2WicgBZ. 
147. See Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Enforcement Trends Charts, 
https://bit.ly/2EPmIGe (last visited Sep. 18, 2019). 
148. See, e.g., Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., 
Prosecuting Antitrust Crimes, Address at Georgetown University Law Center Global 
Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (Sept. 10, 2014), https://bit.ly/2UvHTCy; Thomas O. 
Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Perspectives on Cartel 
Enforcement in the United States and Brazil, Address at the Universidade de São Paolo 
(Apr. 28, 2008), https://bit.ly/2wyRw9I . 
149. See Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945) (“[A]rrangements or 
combinations designed to stifle competition cannot be immunized by adopting a 
membership device accomplishing that purpose.”); Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football 
League, 560 U.S. 183, 191 (2010) (“[W]e have repeatedly found instances in which 
members of a legally single entity violated § 1 when the entity was controlled by a group 
of competitors and served, in essence, as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.”). 
150. Chris Sagers, Why Copperweld Was Actually Kind of Dumb: Sound, Fury and 
the Once and Still Missing Antitrust Theory of the Firm, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 377, 
387 (2011).  
151. The antitrust agencies have stated the following: 
The mere coordination of decisions on output is not integration . . . . Th[is] 
agreement is of a type so likely to harm competition and to have no significant 
ART 1 - COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2019  4:02 PM 
28 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:1 
A. Co-op Accommodations in Antitrust Law 
Since the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, Congress and the 
courts have made multiple efforts to accommodate cooperatives. Through 
the Clayton Act in 1914 and Capper-Volstead Act in 1922, Congress 
established antitrust exemptions for agricultural cooperatives. With the 
Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1933, Congress sought to 
protect the activities of labor unions from antitrust challenge. 
1. Protection for Agricultural Cooperatives 
In the early decades of the Sherman Act, agricultural cooperatives 
confronted a real risk of antitrust prosecutions. This was ironic: farmers 
and their associations were among the earliest victims of the trusts and 
became principal promoters of federal antitrust law.152 As organizations 
that sought to build the collective power of individual farmers, 
cooperatives and their members feared that they and their activities would 
be condemned as illegal restraints of trade under the Sherman Act.153 
Indeed, several state courts held that cooperatives were illegal under their 
antitrust laws. For instance, in 1913, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that 
a cooperative of hog farmers violated the state’s law prohibiting price 
fixing.154 Additionally, milk dealers repeatedly brought antitrust suits 
against dairy cooperatives, alleging illegal restraints of trade.155 These 
antitrust actions and decisions posed a serious threat to the ongoing 
existence and activities of cooperatives.  
Due to the concerns of farmers and their cooperatives, Congress 
established an antitrust immunity for agricultural cooperatives. The 
Clayton Act provided immunity for certain types of agricultural 
cooperatives. The relevant section of the Clayton Act provides that 
“[n]othing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the 
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existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural 
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having 
capital stock or conducted for profit[.]”156A sponsor of the bill in the House 
described this exemption as making express what had been implicit until 
then: antitrust laws were not intended to apply to farmers’ cooperatives.157 
Examining the legislative record of the Sherman Act, Senator Hollis said 
that “[a]t that time no one imagined that labor unions or farmers’ 
associations would come within the act. No abuses from such 
organizations challenged attention.”158 This exemption notably excluded 
cooperatives with capital stock and thereby did not immunize the largest 
segment of agricultural cooperatives at the time the act was being 
debated.159 
The Capper-Volstead Act, enacted in the midst of a serious 
agricultural depression, built on and broadened the Clayton Act’s 
immunity for cooperatives.160 This statute expanded the immunity to cover 
cooperatives with capital stock and established criteria for qualifying 
cooperatives. To be eligible for the Capper-Volstead immunity, a co-op 
must comprise producers of agricultural products, such as “farmers, 
planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers,” and “collectively 
process[], prepar[e] for market, handl[e], and market[] in interstate and 
foreign commerce, such products of persons so engaged.”161 Furthermore, 
a qualifying co-op must either limit all members to no more than one vote 
or cap dividends on stock or membership capital at 8 percent per year, and 
must not handle, by value, more non-member products than member 
products.162 Recognizing that these cooperatives could raise the price of 
agricultural products to the detriment of consumers, the Capper-Volstead 
Act granted the USDA the authority to investigate and obtain cease-and-
desist orders against cooperatives that engaged in conduct, such as 
monopolization and restraints of trade, that “unduly enhanced” the price 
of an agricultural product.163 Subsequently, in 1934, Congress created an 
antitrust immunity, structured like the Capper-Volstead Act, to cover 
cooperatives composed of fishers.164 
 
156. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2018 & Supp. 2017) (emphasis added). 
157. See 51 CONG. REC. 9540–41 (1914) (statement of Rep. Henry). 
158. Id. at 13967. 
159. See KNAPP, supra note 155, at 4. 
160. For background on the political currents and debate leading up to the passage of 
the Capper-Volstead Act, see id. at 4–11; Lauck, supra note 152, at 491–93.  
161. 7 U.S.C. § 291. 
162. Id. 
163. 7 U.S.C. § 292. 
164. 15 U.S.C. §§ 521–22. Importantly, the Supreme Court held in 1926 that the 
federal government and states could enact laws to support the growth of cooperative 
enterprise, without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Liberty Warehouse 
Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers’ Coop. Mktg. Ass’n, 276 U.S. 71 (1928). 
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The Capper-Volstead Act was described as a means of granting 
farmers the freedom to build power in the marketplace. Representative 
Volstead held that the new law would allow farmers to combine just as 
“[b]usiness men can combine by putting their money into corporations.”165 
Senator Capper stated that the statute would allow farmers to “bargain 
collectively” so as to enjoy the privileges that corporations already 
possessed.166 Several members of Congress predicted that farmers, using 
the cooperative form, would be able to integrate into processing of 
agricultural goods and reduce the markups imposed by corporate 
processors, thereby benefiting the general public too.167 
The Supreme Court has articulated the bounds of the Capper-
Volstead immunity. The Court has held that cooperatives must be 
comprised entirely of producers to be entitled to the immunity.168 The 
presence of even one non-producer, such as a non-integrated agricultural 
processor, deprives a cooperative of the Capper-Volstead immunity. 
Although the Capper-Volstead Act creates a special USDA price oversight 
process, the Court has held that this system supplements rather than 
displaces the primary antitrust statutes.169 Certain forms of cooperative 
behavior are not immunized under Capper-Volstead. Agreements between 
a cooperative and a non-cooperative, including a cooperative’s acquisition 
of a non-cooperative firm,170 or between a cooperative and a non-producer 
are not immune from the antitrust laws.171 Furthermore, cooperatives can 
be held liable for predatory and other unfair conduct that hurts competitors 
and consumers.172 In recent years, lower courts have held that cooperative 
conduct and rules that directly regulate production are also not immune 
from antitrust challenge. For instance, courts have held that efforts to 
 
165. 61 CONG. REC. 1033 (1921). 
166. 62 CONG. REC. 2057 (1922). 
167. See id. at 2049 (statement of Sen. Kellogg); id. at 2059 (statement of Sen. 
Capper); id. at 2259, 2275 (statement of Sen. Norris). 
168. See Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 394–95 (1967); 
Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 827–28 (1978). 
169. See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 205–06 (1939); see also Sunkist 
Growers, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 464 F. Supp. 302, 310–11 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
170. See Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 472 
(1960). A few courts have held that voluntary mergers between cooperatives are 
immunized under the Capper-Volstead Act. See Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 
635 F.2d 1037, 1045 (2d Cir. 1980); Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1182 
(8th Cir. 1982). 
171. See Borden, 308 U.S. at 204–05. 
172. See Md. & Va. Milk Producers, 362 U.S. at 468. 
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directly regulate the production of mushrooms173 and potatoes174 were 
outside the scope of the Capper-Volstead immunity.175 
2. Partial Antitrust Exemption for Collective Action by 
Workers 
Even more so than agricultural cooperatives, unions and concerted 
activity among workers faced grave threats from the federal antitrust laws 
at the turn of the twentieth century. These precedents are newly relevant 
at a time when union and cooperative strategies are once again blending, 
especially among freelance and contract workers.176 Although the 
principal congressional drafters of the Sherman Act did not intend for it to 
apply to worker organizing,177 the federal government and employers 
frequently used the new law to target workers when they exercised their 
power.178 Federal prosecutions under the Sherman Act targeted labor as 
often as capital in the early years.179 Employers and supportive federal 
administrations viewed the Sherman Act as an important weapon against 
secondary boycotts and strikes.180 Through these methods, workers and 
their unions sought to apply pressure on parties that conducted business 
with companies that resisted unionization of the workplace.181 In 1908, the 
Supreme Court held that workers and their unions could be liable for 
damages to businesses from secondary boycotts and strikes.182 
In 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Act and established an express 
antitrust exemption for labor unions, as well as farmer cooperatives. The 
exemption reads: 
 
173. See In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d 274, 291 
(E.D. Pa. 2009).  
174. See In re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1157 
(D. Idaho 2011). 
175. See generally Alison Peck, The Cost of Cutting Agricultural Output: 
Interpreting the Capper-Volstead Act, 80 MO. L. REV. 451 (2015). 
176. See, e.g., Vic Vaiana, Disrupting Uber, JACOBIN (July 31, 2016), 
https://bit.ly/2aXpYPS (describing ridesharing drivers’ efforts to improve working 
conditions and terms of work and develop cooperatively owned alternatives to Uber). 
177. See Joseph L. Greenslade, Labor Unions and the Sherman Act: Rethinking 
Labor’s Nonstatutory Exemption, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 151, 155–56 (1988). 
178. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT 95–96 (1989). See, e.g., United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated 
Council, 54 F. 994 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893). 
179. See William Letwin, The First Decade of the Sherman Act: Early 
Administration, 68 YALE L.J. 464 (1959). 
180. Secondary actions involve boycotting and striking companies that do business 
with a firm subject to a labor dispute. See Robert M. Schwartz, Secondary Targets Can Be 
Union’s Primary Focus, LABOR NOTES (June 20, 2012), https://bit.ly/2Z83pQt. 
181. See DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO 
CORPORATE LIBERALISM 71–72 (1995). 
182. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 308–09 (1908). 
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The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. 
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the 
existence and operation of labor . . . organizations . . .  nor shall such 
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal 
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust 
laws.183 
Several sponsors of the bill in Congress championed the exemption 
as a means of undoing a judicial misinterpretation of the Sherman Act and 
establishing clear protection for workers. Representative Quinn, reviewing 
the legislative history of the Sherman Act, asserted that “[t]he whole 
record shows that the great lawyers of that Congress never dreamed of 
such an outrage as the Sherman antitrust law being construed by the courts 
so as to affect the farmers and labor organizations of this country.”184 With 
the new exemption, the sponsors of the Clayton Act believed that the 
courts would no longer be able to use antitrust law to police the activities 
of workers and to aid employers in labor disputes.185 Notwithstanding 
Congress’s intent, the courts continued to apply the Sherman Act to the 
activities of labor and did so until the New Deal’s overhaul of labor market 
regulations in the 1930s.186 Only after Congress passed the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in the midst of the Great Depression, did the Supreme 
Court grant labor the ability to act with broad freedom from antitrust 
interference.187 
Congress’s serial efforts to protect labor have created important 
protections for a subset of American workers. Labor unions and other 
worker collectives, composed of workers classified as employees under 
federal law, enjoy broad latitude to act to advance their members’ interests. 
Not all workers can avail themselves of the antitrust immunity, because of 
how the courts have interpreted the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. 
 
183. 15 U.S.C. § 17.  
184. 51 CONG. REC. 9546 (1914) (statement of Rep. Quinn). 
185. See generally Louis B. Boudin, Organized Labor and the Clayton Act: Part II, 
29 VA. L. REV. 395 (1943). 
186. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 478 (1921). 
William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 188 (2001).  
187. This landmark statute did not speak specifically about the Sherman Act or other 
antitrust laws. Rather, it deprives the federal courts of equity jurisdiction in labor disputes. 
29 U.S.C. § 101 (2012 & Supp. 2017). A 1940 Supreme Court decision explained the 
relationship between antitrust and labor organizing in the wake of New Deal reforms. 
Federal legislation aimed at protecting and favoring labor organizations and 
eliminating the competition of employers and employees based on labor 
conditions regarded as substandard, through the establishment of industry-wide 
standards both by collective bargaining and by legislation setting up minimum 
wage and hour standards, supports the conclusion that Congress does not regard 
the effects upon competition from such combinations and standards as against 
public policy or condemned by the Sherman Act. 
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 504 n.24 (1940) 
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The antitrust exemption for the collective action of workers applies only 
to workers who are classified as employees under federal labor law.188  
The crabbed judicial interpretation of the labor exemption189 creates 
a real threat to many workers who seek to organize. Workers who are 
classified, or misclassified,190 as independent contractors are not protected 
from the antitrust laws, and employers today classify a growing number of 
workers as independent contractors.191 Due to the real risk of antitrust 
investigations and litigation,192 independent contractors may be deterred 
from organizing and, if they seek to organize, be sued by the federal 
government or employers.193 
B. How Current Antitrust Doctrine Impedes Certain 
Cooperative Forms and Not Others 
Antitrust law, as currently interpreted, presents serious legal risks to 
certain cooperative activities and forms. Cooperatives and other 
collectives that only seek to aggregate the power of individual members 
(whether consumers, workers, or small firms) and do not engage in any 
 
188. See, e.g., Taylor v. Local No.7, Int’l Union of Journeymen Horseshoers, 353 
F.2d 593, 597 (4th Cir. 1965); Spence v. Se. Alaska Pilots’ Ass’n, 789 F. Supp. 1007, 
1012–13 (D. Alaska 1990). The Supreme Court also declined to extend the labor exemption 
to cover fishers who were in a position similar to workers but were formally independent 
entrepreneurs. Columbia River Packers Assn., Inc. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1940). 
For an interesting intersection between antitrust law and small producer cooperation, see 
the Department of Justice’s enforcement action against Maine lobstermen over their 
collective effort to raise prices in the 1950s following the Great Lobster War. United States 
v. Me. Lobstermen’s Ass’n, 160 F. Supp. 115, 116 (D. Me. 1957); Michael L. O’Brien, 
Mayday, Mayday: Maine’s Lobstermen Need Exemption from Federal Antitrust Laws, 19 
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 145, 147-51 (2014). 
189. See generally Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability 
for Worker Collective Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 969 (2016). 
190. See Danny Vinik, The Real Future of Work, POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://politi.co/2EUSHTP (“[S]tate-level audits indicate that about 10 percent to 30 
percent of American workers are currently misclassified. There are also some indications 
that misclassification is becoming more widespread.”). 
191. See Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative 
Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015, 71 ILR REV. 382 (finding that “the 
percentage of workers engaged in alternative work arrangements—defined as temporary 
help agency workers, on-call workers, contract company workers, and independent 
contractors or freelancers—rose from 10.7 [percent] in February 2005 to . . . 15.8 [percent] 
in late 2015” and all of the net employment growth in the U.S. economy between 2005 and 
2015 happened in these alternative work arrangements). 
192. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
193. Consider the port truck drivers’ efforts to organize: 
The counsel to the [drivers’] campaign noted that the campaign was extremely 
cautious about worker collective action on antitrust grounds in its early years, 
observing: Apart from the merits and whether damages were recovered, the sheer 
cost of defending such an action would have been sufficient to shut the campaign 
down. 
Paul, supra note 189, at 982.  
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integrated activity face significant antitrust obstacles. Federal antitrust 
agencies and courts have condemned this exercise of collective power as 
an illegal restraint of trade. In contrast, cooperatives that engage in more 
than collective bargaining and operate as integrated firms in production, 
distribution, or retail face much less antitrust risk. Indeed, their risk of 
antitrust liability is comparable to that faced by investor-owned firms. 
1. Bargaining Cooperatives 
Because of its formalistic refusal to differentiate between economic 
actors and almost single-minded fixation on collusion, the contemporary 
antitrust regime is suspicious of joint action between independent 
economic actors, large and small alike. Collusion is collusion, whether it 
is done by an international cartel seeking to profit off consumers or small 
producers aiming to build power against a monopsony buyer.194 This 
enforcement philosophy results in “a bias against Lilliputians” and 
antitrust hostility against relatively powerless actors.195 In contrast to large 
businesses, consumers, small businesses, and workers can generally 
exercise power only through collective action.196  Notwithstanding their 
lack of power in the economy, workers or small suppliers seeking to build 
bargaining power vis-à-vis a powerful purchaser are treated as engaging 
in collusion. 
By bringing together consumers, farmers, small businesses, or 
workers, bargaining cooperatives seek to exercise the collective power of 
their members to obtain better terms of trade. Depending on their 
membership, bargaining co-ops try to obtain higher wages for workers, 
higher prices for small suppliers, or more affordable goods and services 
for consumers. In the jargon of the antitrust agencies, bargaining co-ops 
seek to “coordinate decisions on price [and] output.”197 The antitrust 
agencies’ activities against cooperative bargaining among independent 
workers are instructive on how they treat cooperation between small 
players.  
In recent years, a range of professions, small firms, and their 
associations have faced the wrath of federal antitrust law. The FTC has 
 
194. See Geoffrey Green, Unflattering Resemblance, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 13, 
2015, 1:18 P.M.), https://bit.ly/2XkESH7.  
195. See generally Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act’s Unintended Bias Against 
Lilliputians: Small Players’ Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195 (2000). Lilliputians are the diminutive residents of the island nation 
of Lilliput in Gulliver’s Travels. See generally JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER’S TRAVELS 
(1726). 
196. See Grimes, supra note 195, at 206. 
197. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG 
COMPETITORS § 3.2 (2000). 
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brought cases against associations of ice-skating coaches,198 music 
teachers,199 and organists200 for acting collectively to restrict head-to-head 
competition and raise their incomes. In one of the more notorious uses of 
antitrust law, the Reagan-era FTC sued public defenders in Washington, 
D.C. because they collectively refused to represent indigent defendants 
until the city raised their meager hourly rates.201 In a similar spirit, the FTC 
has brought many cases against doctors for bargaining collectively,202 
including against an association of independent doctors in North Texas for 
bargaining collectively with private insurers.203 In upholding the FTC’s 
ruling against the doctors, a federal court condemned the doctors’ group 
for “using collective bargaining power to demand higher fees for 
physicians who were already under contract at a lower fee.”204  
Federal antitrust agencies have also advocated against collective 
bargaining rights for small players in the economy. In November 2017, the 
DOJ and FTC filed a brief in support of the Chamber of Commerce in its 
lawsuit challenging the City of Seattle’s ordinance granting collective 
bargaining rights to Uber and cab drivers.205 This antitrust hostility toward 
the powerless is not aberrant. For example, in 2008, the FTC criticized and 
opposed an Ohio executive order that would grant collective bargaining 
rights to underpaid, overworked206 home health aides.207 
 
198. See In re Prof’l Skaters Ass’n, No. C-4509, 2015 FTC LEXIS 46 (F.T.C. Feb. 
13, 2015). 
199. See In re Music Teachers Nat’l Ass’n, No. C-4448, 2014 FTC LEXIS 68 (F.T.C. 
Apr. 3, 2014); In re Nat’l Ass’n of Teachers of Singing, Inc., No. C-4491, 2014 FTC LEXIS 
218 (F.T.C. Oct. 1, 2014). 
200. See In re Am. Guild of Organists, No. C-4617, 2017 FTC LEXIS 76 (F.T.C. 
May 26, 2017). 
201. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Ct. Trial Law. Ass’n., 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
202. See In re Praxedes E. Alvarez Santiago, 2013 FTC LEXIS 66; In re M. Catherine 
Higgins, 149 F.T.C. 1114 (2010); In re Conn. Chiropractic Ass’n, 2008 FTC LEXIS 44; In 
re Me. Health Alliance, 136 F.T.C. 616 (2003). 
203. See N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 528 F.3d 346, 352 (5th 
Cir. 2008). 
204. Id. at 369. In addition to the federal antitrust agencies, employers have also used 
antitrust laws in attempts to defeat the organizing of independent contractors. E.g., Michael 
Paulson, Theater Producers Accuse Casting Directors of Forming Illegal Cartel, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2W3D2Jx. 
205. See Brief for The United States & Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellant, Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 2018 
U.S. App. LEXIS 19395 (9th Cir.) (No. 17-35640), 2017 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 737; 
see also Marshall Steinbaum, The Feds Side Against Alt-Labor, NEXT NEW DEAL: THE 
BLOG OF THE ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE (Nov. 16, 2017), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/feds-
side-against-alt-labor/. 
206. See Vann R. Newkirk II, The Forgotten Providers, ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2016), 
https://bit.ly/2WhDR68. 
207. See Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Michael R. Baye & Jeffrey Schmidt, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, to William J. Seitz, Ohio Senate 4–5 (Feb. 14, 2008), 
https://bit.ly/2WHjKy0. 
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In the current antitrust environment, bargaining cooperatives exist, at 
best, uneasily. The federal antitrust agencies, the FTC, in particular, have 
sued associations of professionals and other independent workers for 
engaging in collective bargaining and adopting restraints on direct price 
competition. Under current antitrust law, bargaining cooperatives are 
suspect and may even be condemned as per se illegal. Indeed, prevailing 
antitrust policy represents an existential threat to the core mission of 
bargaining co-ops to aggregate, permitting them to exist so long as they 
do not exercise the collective power of their individual members. In other 
words, antitrust law tolerates bargaining cooperatives that do not bargain 
cooperatively. As a result, organizations like the Freelancers Union208 in 
the United States and SMart209 in Europe, which have hundreds of 
thousands of members between them, would face significant constraints 
on their ability to advocate collectively for a class of independent workers. 
In an economy in which independent workers represent a significant share 
of the workforce, it is essential that independent workers have the ability 
to establish collective organizations and build collective voice.  
2. Production, Distribution, and Retail Cooperatives 
Cooperatives that bring together participants to develop jointly 
owned production, distribution, or retail services face much lower antitrust 
risk and are likely to be treated like investor-owned businesses. Antitrust 
doctrine has long recognized that integration of production activities can 
create economies of scale and other efficiencies.210 In recent decades, the 
federal antitrust agencies and courts have further relaxed antitrust rules to 
encourage this type of collaboration among businesses.211 The Competitor 
Collaboration Guidelines state that “collaboration may facilitate the 
attainment of scale or scope economies beyond the reach of any single 
participant.”212 Accordingly, the DOJ and FTC state that they will 
generally examine these types of collaborations and the associated 
restraints under the fact-specific rule of reason, rather than deem them per 
se illegal.213  The Supreme Court has held that collaboration between rivals 
can yield new products or services that no individual party may be able to 
 
208. See FREELANCERS UNION, https://freelancersunion.org (last visited Sep. 6, 
2019). 
209. See What Is SMart?, http://smartbe.be/media/uploads/2015/07/What-is-
SMart.pdf (last visited Sep. 6, 2019). 
210. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“[S]ome 
of the results of large integrated or chain operations are beneficial to consumers.”). 
211. See, e.g., Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 151, at § 2.1.; United 
States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F. 2d 981, 990–91 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
212. Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 151, at § 2.1. 
213. See id. at § 3.2. 
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offer.214 In the case Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether price setting by an oil refining joint venture between Shell and 
Texaco was per se illegal.215 The Court held that the pricing decisions of 
an integrated joint venture between rivals are not per se illegal and should 
be evaluated under the rule of reason.216  
In light of agency guidance and legal precedents, production, 
distribution, and retail cooperatives are likely to receive much more 
favorable antitrust treatment than bargaining cooperatives. A cooperative 
that unites competing farmers or workers to create production facilities 
that would otherwise not exist is beneficial, per the prevailing 
interpretation of antitrust law.217 In contrast to bargaining cooperatives, the 
mere existence of such a production cooperative would not be a per se 
violation of antitrust law. Antitrust law would treat this cooperative in the 
same way it treats an investor-owned corporation. The cooperative would 
be presumptively legal under antitrust law and could engage in a range of 
business conduct. A production cooperative, however, would not be 
permitted to engage in collusive or exclusionary practices, nor undertake 
anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions.218 
Over the past 80 years, the Supreme Court has noted the economic 
benefits of the integrated cooperative form. In the 1945 case, Associated 
Press v. United States,219 the Court evaluated the cooperative wire 
service’s restrictions on the admission of new member-newspapers and the 
distribution of news reports to non-member newspapers.220 The Court 
recognized that AP could collect and distribute a breadth and depth of 
news stories that no single newspaper could hope to match.221 In other 
words, AP, as a cooperative, pooled the resources of hundreds of 
newspapers to create a product—comprehensive domestic and 
international news reporting—that otherwise would not exist.  
While appreciating the benefits of the cooperative venture, the Court 
found that AP’s restrictive membership policies amounted to the “erection 
of obstacles to the acquisition of membership . . . [, which made] it 
difficult, if not impossible, for non-members to get any of the news 
 
214. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 & 23 
(1979). 
215. See generally Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
216. See id. at 7. 
217. Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 151, at § 2.1. 
218. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118 (2009); 
United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 349–50 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
219. See generally Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
220. See id. at 4–5. 
221. See id. at 18 (“[T]he District Court’s unchallenged finding was that ‘AP is a vast, 
intricately reticulated organization, the largest of its kind, gathering news from all over the 
world, the chief single source of news for the American press, universally agreed to be of 
great consequence.’”). 
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furnished by AP or any of the individual members of this combination of 
American newspaper publishers.”222 Given the importance of AP wire 
reports to all newspapers, the Court held that these restrictions were 
anticompetitive.223 The Court, in effect, imposed a non-discrimination 
duty on a cooperatively-created “essential facility.”224 Intentionally or not, 
the decision also brought AP into more complete compliance with the 
International Co-operative Alliance principle of “open membership.”225 
In 1972, the Court again recognized the productive advantages of the 
cooperative form. In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,226 the Court 
evaluated the legality of the food purchasing cooperative’s restrictions on 
where members could sell Topco brands.227 The Court held that the selling 
restraints were per se illegal.228 Although the Court invalidated the 
particular contracts at issue, it recognized the competitive benefits of the 
cooperative. According to the Court, the development of Topco private 
label brands had strengthened the competitive position of its members, 
mostly small and medium-sized grocery stores.229 The Court found that 
though “only 10% of the total goods sold by Topco members bear the 
association’s brand names, the profit on these goods [was] substantial and 
their very existence has improved the competitive potential of Topco 
members with respect to other large and powerful chains.”230 
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & 
Printing Co.,231 the Court resolved whether a small purchasing 
cooperative’s decision to expel a member is a per se illegal group 
boycott.232 The Court noted the advantages of the cooperative, stating that 
it “permits the participating retailers to achieve economies of scale in both 
the purchase and warehousing of wholesale supplies, and also ensures 
ready access to a stock of goods that might otherwise be unavailable on 
short notice.”233 The cooperative allowed the small retailers, who were its 
members, “to compete more effectively with larger retailers.”234 Because 
 
222. Id. at 9. 
223. See id. at 18–19. 
224. See Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and “Essential Facilities”: From Terminal 
Railroad to Microsoft, 62 SMU L. REV. 557, 569–70 (2009). 
225. JONATHAN SILBERSTEIN-LOEB, THE INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS: 
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, PRESS ASSOCIATION, AND REUTERS, 1848–1947 (2014). 
226. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
227. See id. at 602–03. 
228. See id. at 612. 
229. See id. at 600. 
230. Id. 
231. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 
284 (1985). 
232. See id. at 285–86. 
233. Id. at 295. 
234. Id. 
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the cooperative lacked market power or “exclusive access to an element 
essential to effective competition,” the Court held that the cooperative’s 
membership policies and decisions should be examined under the rule of 
reason.235 
The DOJ, the FTC, and the Supreme Court have seen the economic 
advantages of the cooperative form. In their guidelines on Competitor 
Collaborations, the DOJ and the FTC have stated that economic 
collaboration can create public benefits and that the antitrust laws should 
permit such joint activity. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has 
observed that cooperatives can allow independent economic actors to 
come together and carry out functions that are beyond the capacity of any 
single member. At the same time, the Court has applied traditional antitrust 
doctrines to cooperatives to ensure that they cannot use their power to the 
detriment of consumers and competitors. 
V. HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND STATES CAN PROTECT AND 
ENCOURAGE THE GROWTH OF COOPERATIVE BUSINESSES 
Even though antitrust law offers significant scope for certain forms 
of cooperatives to exist and thrive, Congress, the courts, the federal 
antitrust agencies, and the states can take several steps to protect and 
encourage all types of cooperative entities. Cooperatives can allow 
ordinary Americans to build power and take control of their economic and 
political lives—control that is especially lacking at a time of staggering 
income and wealth inequality and high concentration across the 
economy.236 Under the present interpretation of the antitrust laws, 
cooperatives face a range of antitrust risks, ranging from minimal to 
significant. Integrated cooperatives that combine the economic resources 
of many consumers, producers, and workers are likely to receive the same 
antitrust treatment that investor-owned businesses do. By way of example, 
an electric distribution cooperative owned by residents of a rural area can 
almost certainly exist and operate without antitrust interference and be 
entitled to rule of reason treatment in the event of antitrust litigation. In 
contrast, cooperatives that are created solely to build the bargaining power 
of members, such as consumers or small suppliers, vis-à-vis more 
powerful economic actors are more likely to face significant antitrust risks. 
Indeed, prevailing antitrust precedent may even condemn these 
cooperatives as per se illegal.  
 
235. Id. at 296. 
236. See Council of Econ. Advisors, Benefits of Competition and Indicators of 
Market Power 7 (Apr. 2016), https://bit.ly/2zeysNg; Brett Ryder, Riding the Wave, 
ECONOMIST (Oct. 3, 2013), https://econ.st/2KwPO0J. 
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Although the antitrust threat may appear to be confined to bargaining 
cooperatives, antitrust law is likely to impede the creation of new 
cooperatives in general. Many prospective distribution or production 
cooperatives may have to start as bargaining collectives. Given the 
challenges of establishing a cooperative enterprise, the creation of a 
bargaining cooperative may be a necessary first step on the path to 
building an integrated business.237 Over time, the bargaining cooperative 
can acquire the resources and organizational cohesion necessary to 
establish production or distribution operations. For instance, the economist 
Richard Wolff has described the transformative potential of labor unions 
as, “a training ground, an experiential school, to teach working people how 
and why a worker co-op is the logical end of the whole process.”238 In 
other words, building cooperative power is often a necessary first step and 
precondition to building a cooperative firm. Recognizing this dynamic 
feature of cooperative formation and growth underscores the antitrust 
threat. By condemning joint bargaining activity as “price fixing,” antitrust 
law may stifle the formation of not just bargaining cooperatives, but 
ultimately new distribution and production cooperatives, too.  
The federal government and the states can take important steps to 
protect and promote the cooperative form. They should address the 
existential threat posed by antitrust to certain cooperatives and place them, 
regardless of their purpose, on a level footing with investor-owned 
corporations. Indeed, in light of their socially desirable ownership 
structure cooperative enterprises should, in general, receive more 
favorable antitrust treatment than their investor-owned counterparts. At a 
minimum, federal and state governments should reform the scope and 
enforcement of antitrust law to provide legal protection for cooperatives 
of all forms and encourage the growth of this socially desirable business 
form.  
 
237. The historical development of some farm co-ops is illustrative: 
[USDA cooperative expert C.E.] Bassett favored the use of a joint buying 
group—which “handles no money . . ., extends no credit, and orders no goods 
except for cash in the bank’ as the ‘safest and most economical” purchasing plan. 
However, he recognized that such groups should acquire warehouses when the 
business grew large enough to warrant it. In such cases he favored selling 
supplies at regular retail prices and dividing savings according to patronage at 
the end of the year. But he urged caution in moving forward. “As the child learns 
to walk before it runs, so a community should be satisfied to begin working 
together in the simplest ways and should undertake more elaborate plans only as 
their cooperative strength and confidence is developed.” 
KNAPP, supra note 86, at 321.  
238. Richard W. Briefly, Richard Wolff on Unions and Worker Co-ops, YOUTUBE 
(Dec. 2, 2017), https://bit.ly/314x1Qi. 
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A. Congress: Expand and Refine Capper-Volstead Exemption 
to Cover Cooperatives Outside Agriculture 
The Capper-Volstead Act offers a model on which to build legislation 
to protect and encourage the growth of the cooperative form. The Act 
grants farmers the freedom to band together to engage in collective 
bargaining, processing, distribution, and marketing. The sponsors of the 
law recognized that farmers needed freedom to act in concert to build 
power against dominant corporate actors and engage in economic activity 
on democratic lines.239 Congress should extend this core principle to all 
cooperatives. Antitrust law, at present, serves as a major obstacle to 
collective activity between independent economic actors, like workers 
classified as independent contractors and consumers.  Consumers, small 
firms, or workers who band together to build leverage against powerful 
corporate purchasers or sellers run the serious risk of inviting antitrust 
investigations and liability. Extending the principle of Capper-Volstead to 
cooperative activity between consumers, workers, and other “Lilliputians” 
in the United States political economy would foster the growth of 
cooperative entities. 
A legislative generalization of the Capper-Volstead Act should have 
clear boundaries over who can participate and what entities and activities 
are protected from antitrust liability. As in the Capper-Volstead Act, the 
exemption should be restricted to organizations that are established for the 
mutual benefit of co-op members.240 To ensure that cooperatives are 
democratically governed, the general cooperative exemption should be 
available only to organizations that follow the one member, one vote 
principle.241 This requirement would be more restrictive than the Capper-
Volstead Act, which does not require protected cooperatives to be run on 
democratic lines. To qualify for the Capper-Volstead exemption, a 
cooperative can either follow the one member, one vote principle or limit 
annual dividends at 8 percent.242 Democratic governance should not be 
optional for cooperatives entitled to antitrust immunity. A requirement for 
one-member-one-vote governance would advance a core democratic value 
 
239. See supra Section IV.B.1. 
240. The Capper-Volstead Act’s antitrust exemption applies only to “associations . . . 
operated for the mutual benefit of the members” and requires that “association[s] shall not 
deal in the products of nonmembers to an amount greater in value than such as are handled 
by it for members.” 7 U.S.C. § 291. 
241. Some states are diluting this core principle of cooperatives. In November 2017, 
Wisconsin changed its cooperative law to allow co-ops to authorize members to vote in 
proportion to patronage or equity ownership. UW CTR. FOR COOPERATIVES, Summary: 
2017 Changes to Wisconsin’s Cooperative Law (Dec. 4, 2017), http://bit.ly/2YZ8NFh. 
242. See id. 
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of cooperatives and the historical cooperative movement, as well as protect 
against managerial and non-member misuse of the cooperative form.243 
A general cooperative immunity should also draw on the Capper-
Volstead Act’s pro-consumer framework. The statute grants the USDA the 
authority to investigate and remedy cooperative conduct that unduly 
enhances consumer prices.244 This special provision allows the USDA to 
protect the public against cooperatives that gain market power and raise 
prices to consumers above a fair level. This authority ensures that 
cooperatives cannot unduly enrich themselves at the expense of the 
consuming public. Instead of the specialized USDA, the FTC (which has 
jurisdiction over most sectors of the economy) could be granted authority 
to investigate cooperatives that have market power and raise prices to the 
detriment of retail consumers or otherwise impair the public interest. 
Alternatively, a specialized regulator devoted exclusively to co-ops could 
be given this power.245 
The courts have added two important glosses to the Capper-Volstead 
Act that should be included in a general statutory exemption for 
cooperatives. First, the exemption is limited to cooperatives comprised 
entirely of producers—namely farmers. The presence of a single non-
farmer, such as a corporate processor, deprives the cooperative of Capper-
Volstead immunity. This condition ensures that investor-owned 
businesses cannot immunize their anticompetitive conduct by creating or 
joining agricultural cooperatives. A statutory expansion of Capper-
Volstead should adopt an analogous requirement and restrict cooperative 
membership to discrete classes of individuals and businesses.  
Justice William Brennan explained the importance of clearly defining 
who is—and is not—eligible for Capper-Volstead immunity in his 
concurrence in National Broiler Marketing Assn. v. United States:246  
It is hard to believe that in enacting a provision to authorize horizontal 
combinations for purposes of collective processing, handling, and 
marketing so as to eliminate middlemen, Congress authorized firms 
which integrated further downstream beyond the level at which 
cooperatives could be utilized for these purposes to combine horizontally 
as a cartel with license to carve up the national agricultural market. Such 
a construction would turn on its head Congress’ manifest purpose to 
 
243. See Douglas, supra note 134 (“According to its 2016 financial statement, 60 
percent of DFA’s net income that year came from ‘non-member business earnings,’ none 
of which was shared with members.”). 
244. See 7 U.S.C. § 292. 
245. By way of example, the National Credit Union Administration is responsible for 
regulating federally insured credit unions. NAT’L CREDIT UNION, ADMIN., Historical 
Timeline http://bit.ly/2WFj8Zx (last visited June 1, 2019). 
246. See generally Nat’l Broiler Marketing Ass’n. v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 
(1978). 
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protect the small, individual economic units engaged in farming from 
exploitation and extinction at the hands of “these large aggregations of 
men who control the avenues and agencies through and by which farm 
products reach the consuming market,” by exempting instead, and 
thereby fomenting “these great trusts, these great corporations, these 
large moneyed institutions” at which the Sherman Act took aim.247 
Informed by Justice Brennan’s insights, a general antitrust exemption 
for cooperatives should be restricted to workers, consumers, and bona fide 
small businesses that fall below certain size thresholds (including 
federations of such cooperatives that permit the realization of economies 
of scale). The alternative is an exemption that allows medium-sized and 
large corporations to use the cooperative form to obtain antitrust 
immunity. 
Second, the Supreme Court has also held that agricultural 
cooperatives, notwithstanding the Capper-Volstead’s exemption, can still 
be liable for exclusionary and predatory conduct.248 In other words, 
farmers can establish a cooperative without running afoul of the Sherman 
Act’s Section 1 prohibition on restraints of trade, but these cooperatives 
are still subject to the Sherman Act’s Section 2 prohibition on 
monopolization and attempted monopolization. The Court’s interpretation 
ensures that agricultural cooperatives cannot resort to exclusionary 
practices, such as exclusive dealing, predatory pricing, and tying, to 
acquire or maintain market dominance. Although they have different 
objectives and incentives than investor-owned businesses, large 
cooperatives may also engage in socially harmful monopolization.249 
Whereas the Capper-Volstead Act arguably immunizes mergers 
between cooperatives from antitrust law,250 a legislative exemption for 
 
247. Id. at  835 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). 
248. United States v. Borden, Co., 308 U.S. 182, 204–05 (1939). 
249. E.g., Andrew Martin, In Dairy Industry Consolidation, Lush Payday, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2WAxTgd (describing allegations of nation’s largest 
dairy cooperative entering into contracts with milk bottlers that enriched co-op 
management and hurt dairy farmer members).  
250. Peter C. Carstensen, Agricultural Cooperatives and the Law: Obsolete Statutes 
in a Dynamic Economy, 58 S.D. L. REV. 462, 487 (2013). One court held that agricultural 
co-ops can acquire a monopoly position through mergers and acquisitions. 
[T]he effect of Capper-Volstead is to prevent the full application of the second 
element of this test to agricultural cooperatives. Capper-Volstead permits the 
formation of such cooperatives and places no limitation on their size. As the 
cooperative grows, so, normally, does its power over the market. Thus, while the 
formation, growth and operation of a powerful cooperative is obviously a 
“willful acquisition or maintenance of such power,” and will rarely result from 
“a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident,” id., it is exactly what 
Capper-Volstead permits. We conclude that Grinnell does not apply to monopoly 
power that results from such acts as the formation, growth and combination of 
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cooperative enterprises should not exempt cooperatives from merger rules. 
Unchecked mergers and acquisitions among cooperatives are undesirable 
for at least two reasons. First, large cooperatives may face serious 
governance issues that defeat the very purpose of the cooperative form. In 
a large cooperative, members may only exercise weak oversight over the 
cooperative’s board and management.251 As a result, the board and 
management may have the latitude to run the cooperative for their own 
benefit, rather than members’ benefit. Certain large agricultural 
cooperatives have suffered from deficient governance in which executives 
have elevated their own interests above those of members’ collective 
interests.252 In general, small and medium-sized cooperatives are more 
likely to be democratically accountable than their larger counterparts. 
Second, although cooperatives’ ownership structure is likely to restrain 
socially undesirable conduct to an extent,253 large cooperatives can work 
against the interests of consumers, producers, workers, and rivals.254 
To ensure that cooperatives work for members and in accordance 
with the larger public interest, a statutory antitrust exemption should 
include restrictions on cooperatives’ mergers and acquisitions. 
Cooperative mergers should be reviewed using the same substantive 
standards as mergers between investor-owned businesses under the 
Clayton Act.255 At the same time, this merger standard should not restrict 
 
agricultural cooperatives, but applies only to the acquisition of such power by 
other, predatory means. 
Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc. 635 F.2d 1037, 1045 (2d Cir. 1980). 
251. See Carstensen, supra note 250, at 479–80. 
252. E.g., Peggy Lowe, Farmers and Their Cooperative Settle Lawsuit on Fixing The 
Price Of Milk, NPR (Jan. 23, 2013, 3:33 AM), https://n.pr/2YZAxcP. To be sure, the 
governance problems at some large cooperatives arise, in part, from weak state cooperative 
governance laws. These laws should be revised to ensure that cooperatives are run in the 
interests of members. See Carstensen, supra note 250, at 478–80, 490–91. 
253. See supra Section III.C. 
254. See Douglas, supra note 134; Carstensen, supra note 250, at 478–81. The record 
of non-profit hospitals can inform the antitrust treatment of cooperatives. In deciding 
government challenges to hospital mergers, some courts have assumed that non-profit 
hospitals are less likely to exercise their market power and more likely to pursue a broad 
community mission. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. 
Supp. 1285, 1295 (W.D. Mich. 1996). Empirical research, however, finds that non-profit 
hospitals often behave similarly to their for-profit counterparts and should be subject to 
comparable antitrust rules. Gary J. Young et al., Comty. Control and Pricing Patterns of 
Nonprofit Hospitals: An Antitrust Analysis, 25 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 1051, 1054 
(2000); Cory Capps et al., Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofits: Should Hospitals Receive 
Special Care?, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. WORKING PAPER SERIES, 36–37 (2017). 
http://bit.ly/2HQXw4o. 
255. The Clayton Act states: 
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock 
or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or 
more persons engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where 
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cooperatives from growing by attracting new members. Seeking growth 
through new membership involves a different dynamic than attempting to 
grow through mergers and acquisitions with other cooperatives. To attract 
new members, a cooperative may need to show that it works for, and 
delivers tangible benefits to, existing members. By contrast, in a growth-
through-merger strategy, a cooperative board and management may be 
able to expand the membership rolls without appealing to new and existing 
members and may even be able to advance their private interests at the 
expense of members’ interests. 256 This distinction is analogous to a 
traditional distinction in American merger law: growth through product 
improvement and investment in new plants is preferable to growth through 
mergers and acquisitions.257 
Although large co-op mergers should be discouraged, cooperatives 
should have broad freedom to establish federated and other joint activities 
with other cooperatives to achieve economies of scale and build new 
productive facilities. Small cooperatives, in particular, may not have the 
means to undertake certain projects. But pursued in conjunction with one 
or more cooperatives, a cooperative can acquire the necessary resources to 
make these investments. For instance, a small retail cooperative may not 
have the resources to establish a regional warehouse to store inventory. In 
partnership with another retail cooperative, however, it may be able to 
construct and run this warehouse and consequently lower their costs of 
purchase and distribution of goods. Under this policy of restricting 
mergers but tolerating joint ventures, cooperatives would be able to 
achieve the virtues of both democratic accountability associated with 
smaller size and the economies of scale resulting from combining certain 
operations.258 
 
in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of 
the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use 
of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 
15 U.S.C. § 18. The current approach to merger review is fact intensive. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), 
https://bit.ly/1FbvENe. 
256. See KNAPP, supra note 86, at 252 (describing how the California citrus 
growers’ cooperative attracted new members through more efficient, effective marketing 
activity). 
257. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (“[S]urely one 
premise of an antimerger statute such as § 7 [of the Clayton Act] is that corporate growth 
by internal expansion is socially preferable to growth by acquisition.”); Sandeep Vaheesan, 
American Prosperity Depends on Stopping Mega-Mergers, FT ALPHAVILLE (Apr. 25, 
2019), https://on.ft.com/2DwQGyk (“[S]trong merger policy channels corporate 
executives’ focus away from the next big deal and toward product improvement and 
investment that deliver more affordable and higher quality goods and services.”). 
258. See KNAPP, supra note 86, at 252 (“In theory and practice, the [citrus fruit] 
growers through their local associations retained full autonomy. They delegated to the 
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B. Courts: Synthesize Existing Antitrust Doctrines to Promote 
Growth of Democratically Accountable Cooperatives 
The courts can draw on and synthesize existing precedent to protect 
bona fide cooperatives259 and ensure that they work in the interests of their 
members. The principles stated in Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. 
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.260 and Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp.261 together can be employed to insulate 
cooperatives with little market power from antitrust challenge. As for 
cooperatives with substantial market power, the non-discrimination 
requirement in Associated Press can be applied to dominant and other 
powerful cooperatives to ensure that they are not engaging in monopolistic 
conduct and are open to all comers.262 
The courts should look to two key precedents when applying the 
antitrust laws to cooperatives that lack market power. In Northwest 
Wholesale Stationers, the Supreme Court held that the membership 
policies of cooperatives that lack market power would be evaluated under 
the rule of reason.263 The Court concluded that the expulsion of a 
cooperative member—in effect a group boycott according to the ousted 
co-op member—would be categorically condemned only if the 
cooperative had market power.264  The cooperative at issue was a 
purchasing cooperative that had integrated the buying operations of small 
stationery retailers.265 As a result, it is unclear whether the principle 
announced in the case would extend to bargaining cooperatives in which 
members only aggregate their individual purchasing or selling power in 
the market. In Copperweld, the Court held that a corporation cannot 
conspire with one of its wholly-owned subsidiaries or divisions.266 The 
Court held that a corporation, regardless of its internal structure, is a single 
entity and, by definition, cannot conspire with itself for purposes of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.267  
Drawing on and synthesizing Northwest Wholesale Stationers and 
Copperweld, the courts should grant a quasi-immunity, or at least apply a 
strong presumption of legality, to cooperatives without market power. 
 
district exchanges and the central exchange only certain broad functions which they were 
not in position to perform for themselves.”). 
259. See supra Section V.A. 
260. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 
(1985). 
261. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
262. See Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21 (1945). 
263. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472 U.S. at 298. 
264. See id. at 296. 
265. See id. at 286. 
266. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 777. 
267. See id. 
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What constitutes a “firm” is fundamentally a legal and political question: 
a collective of independent contractors could be treated as a single entity 
instead of “colluding competitors.” Indeed, labor law has already treated 
two nominally independent economic actors as a single entity for certain 
purposes. For instance, during the latter part of the Obama administration, 
the National Labor Relations Board ruled that, for instance, fast food 
franchisors and franchisees can be joint employers for labor law 
purposes.268 Accordingly, courts should treat a bargaining cooperative as 
a single entity rather than as a “cartel” of its individual members. Applying 
this principle, two members of the same cooperative could be no more 
liable for price fixing than two employees within the same corporation. 
For bargaining cooperatives, this doctrine would free them from the threat 
of price fixing litigation and liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  
One federal appellate decision has applied this logic. The Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in reviewing allegations of monopolization 
against a federated electric generation and transmission cooperative, held 
that this federation was a single entity, stating that “a conglomeration of 
two or more legally distinct entities cannot conspire among themselves if 
 
268. The National Labor Relations Board wrote: 
Today, we restate the Board’s joint-employer standard to reaffirm the standard 
articulated by the Third Circuit in Browning-Ferris decision. Under this standard, 
the Board may find that two or more statutory employers are joint employers of 
the same statutory employees if they share or codetermine those matters 
governing the essential terms and conditions of employment. In determining 
whether a putative joint employer meets this standard, the initial inquiry is 
whether there is a common-law employment relationship with the employees in 
question. If this common-law employment relationship exists, the inquiry then 
turns to whether the putative joint employer possesses sufficient control over 
employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment to permit meaningful 
collective bargaining. 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, *2 (2015) (internal citations 
omitted). But see Press Release, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BD., Board Proposes Rule to 
Change Its Joint-Employer Standard (Sep. 13, 2018), https://bit.ly/2RZapjl. For a 
comparable legal rule in antitrust, consider the issue of whether consumers not in 
contractual privity with an antitrust violator can recover damages. The Supreme Court has 
barred consumer suits for damages when the consumer did not have a direct relationship 
with the antitrust violator. See generally Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
Courts, however, have established an exception to this rule when consumers purchased the 
affected goods from an intermediary over whom the alleged antitrust violator exercises 
control. See id. at 736 n.16 (“Another situation in which market forces have been 
superseded and the pass-on defense might be permitted is where the direct purchaser is 
owned or controlled by its customer.”). See, e.g., Kentucky v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 
No. 3:15-cv-354-DJH-CHL 2018 WL 4620621, at *11 (W.D. Ky. 2018) (“The [c]ourt . . . 
finds that the Commonwealth has sufficiently alleged ‘functional economic unity’ between 
Marathon LP and the retailers in question to make a sale of gasoline to the retailers 
effectively a sale to Kentucky consumers.”). 
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they ‘pursue the common interests of the whole rather than interests 
separate from those of the [group] itself.’”269 
At the same time, dominant co-ops should face clear limits on their 
behavior. The Supreme Court has recognized the market power of 
dominant co-ops and established appropriate restrictions on their 
discretion. In Associated Press, the Court applied special duties on a 
dominant cooperative. The Court held that a dominant cooperative news 
service improperly excluded non-member newspapers from obtaining its 
news stories and joining the cooperative.270 Because of the Court’s 
decision, AP could not use its power to control the competitive landscape 
of the news publishing business across the country. Furthermore, the 
decision required AP to operate as an open, democratic cooperative instead 
of as a closed, exclusive monopoly. The principle announced in this case 
advanced a competitive market for news and also the basic principles of 
cooperative business and should apply to all dominant cooperatives.  
C. Federal Antitrust Agencies: Draw a Distinction Between 
Joint Action Among Relatively Powerless Actors and 
Corporate Collusion 
Even in the absence of Congressional or judicial reforms to insulate 
cooperatives from antitrust lawsuits, the DOJ and FTC should exercise 
their prosecutorial discretion to protect bona fide bargaining cooperatives. 
They should focus on corporate cartels, mergers, and monopolies rather 
than cooperatives composed of consumers, small businesses, and workers. 
Putting aside antitrust philosophy, this prioritization makes sense on 
pragmatic grounds too. With limited enforcement resources, the agencies 
should not police the conduct of these entities. By way of example, a 
hypothetical agency’s use of public money to sue a consumer purchasing 
cooperative is, at best, a questionable use of public money and, at worst, 
indefensible enforcement activity. At a time of rising concentration across 
the economy, the federal antitrust agencies should focus their advocacy 
and enforcement activities on corporate monopolies and oligopolies. 
Collusive conduct between large corporations carries radically 
different economic, political, and social implications than collusion 
between consumers, small businesses, or workers. Indeed, workers 
banding together to bargain collectively with employers is commonly 
described as solidarity, not collusion. This language of collusion versus 
solidarity captures a critical distinction between large businesses 
conspiring to enhance their economic and political power and workers 
 
269. City of Mt. Pleasant v. Assoc. Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 274 (8th Cir. 
1988). 
270. See Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1945). 
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banding together to build countervailing power. Individuals who have 
nothing to sell in the market but their labor power have little or no 
power.271 For millions, a job—any job—may be their only source of 
income and the only thing standing between subsistence and destitution.272 
Similarly, one consumer has little clout in the market: an individual 
boycotting a company for its deceptive marketing, product quality, or 
labor practices has no more than symbolic and personal psychic value. In 
sharp contrast, corporations that control a nation’s means of production 
wield a great deal of economic, political, and social power. Often times, a 
large corporation can exercise power unilaterally and need not resort to 
collusion with rivals.273 
The antitrust agencies should establish a posture of deference toward 
bargaining cooperatives through guidance documents. Through 
enforcement guidance, they could commit to not investigating or initiating 
enforcement actions against collective entities composed of consumers, 
small businesses, or workers when they engage in joint bargaining. 
Although this may sound radical, it would be a pragmatic exercise of 
discretion. Even from the perspective of consumer welfare, the antitrust 
agencies surely have more pressing targets than the professional 
associations representing ice-skating coaches and music teachers.274 The 
new deference policy would signal to the public that the DOJ and the FTC 
 
271. The Supreme Court in the early twentieth century, despite its generally pro-elite 
(and anti-populist) orientation, recognized the importance of collective action among 
workers. The Court in Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 
(1921) stated: 
A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was dependent 
ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the 
employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless 
unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union 
was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer. 
Id. at 209.  
272. See Emmanuel Saez, Income and Wealth Inequality: Evidence and Policy 
Implications, 35 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 7, 8 (2017) (“For the bottom 90% of income 
earners, capital income is negligible relative to labor income.”); FED. RESERVE SYS., supra 
note 63, at 26 (noting that less than half of adults have sufficient personal savings to cover 
three months of expenses in the event of a major financial disruption). 
273. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 63–67 (1965). A Second Circuit decision offers a useful definition of 
market power and ways to identify its existence: 
Market power has been defined by the Supreme Court to mean the power to 
control prices or exclude competition. Such power may be proven through 
evidence of specific conduct undertaken by the defendant that indicates he has 
the power to affect price or exclude competition. Alternatively, market power 
may be presumed if the defendant controls a large enough share of the relevant 
market. 
United States v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal citations 
omitted).  
274. See supra Section III.A.1. 
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would not interfere with the bargaining activities of relatively powerless 
actors and instead would use their resources to investigate and bring 
enforcement actions against corporate mergers and monopolies. Short of 
this general non-prosecution commitment against cooperatives, composed 
of relatively powerless members, the agencies could revise the Competitor 
Collaboration Guidelines to indicate they will not sue bargaining entities 
composed of consumers, small businesses, or workers that have a market 
share less than 30 percent.275 The policy would grant broad latitude to 
cooperative entities, yet allow the antitrust agencies to police the activities 
of co-ops with market power. 
Neither proposed change to enforcement practice would grant 
cooperatives absolute antitrust immunity. In contrast to potential 
legislation enacted by Congress or judicial revision of existing legal 
precedent, the antitrust agencies cannot change the substantive law 
through guidance documents. Even if they pledge not to investigate 
cooperatives or rewrite their Competitor Collaboration Guidelines to 
protect cooperative activity, the substantive standards of the Sherman Act 
would be unchanged. Private parties could still bring lawsuits against 
bargaining cooperatives for engaging in illegal price fixing.  
Nonetheless, these suggested policy changes, if adopted, would 
confer significant benefits to bargaining cooperatives. First, a commitment 
from the antitrust agencies to not pursue investigations and enforcement 
actions would greatly reduce the legal risk to bargaining cooperatives. 
Despite the possibility of private antitrust actions, the investigative and 
enforcement activities of the antitrust agencies may be the greatest 
antitrust threat to many cooperatives.276 Second, the revised Competitor 
Collaboration Guidelines may receive deference in the courts. Today, the 
courts consistently grant significant deference to agency guidance 
documents.277 Even in private lawsuits, the courts may treat the revised 
Guidelines as persuasive evidence in deciding, for instance, whether the 
per se rule should apply to bargaining cooperatives. Moreover, the per se 
prohibition on price fixing is not as absolute as appearances may suggest. 
On occasion, the Supreme Court has considered economic circumstances 
in cases alleging horizontal collusion and qualified the application of the 
 
275. Grimes, supra note 195, at 234. 
276. See Paul, supra note 189, at 981–82 (describing how truck drivers in several 
major ports were hit with an FTC investigation when they attempted to unionize and had 
to account for antitrust liability when they organized). 
277. See Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger 
Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 781–808 (2006) 
(examining growing influence on Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the courts over the past 
40 years). 
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per se rule against price fixing when it believed that cooperation among 
rivals yielded economic and social benefits.278 
D.  States: Authorize and Actively Supervise Cooperatives 
The Supreme Court has created the state action immunity to protect 
the legislative and regulatory of states from antitrust attack. States can 
enact statutes and regulations that restrict competition without risk of 
antitrust liability. Private parties can also invoke the state action immunity 
if they can establish that they are acting pursuant to clearly articulated state 
policy and subject to active supervision by the state. Like other private 
entities, cooperative businesses are entitled to the state action immunity 
and protection from antitrust lawsuits if they satisfy this two-part test. 
The Court established this doctrine in the 1943 decision Parker v. 
Brown.279 The plaintiff in that case challenged a California regulatory 
scheme that governed the production and distribution of raisins.280 The 
Supreme Court held that the state was immune from antitrust liability. It 
wrote that “[t]he Sherman Act makes no mention of the state . . . and gives 
no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action 
directed by a state.”281 The Court further noted that “[t]he sponsor of the 
bill which was ultimately enacted as the Sherman Act declared that it 
prevented only ‘business combinations.’”282 While a group of private 
producers who engaged in collusion would face antitrust liability, this 
conduct was immune once it had the imprimatur of state sanction.283 
 
278. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9–10 
(1979); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 
85, 100–01 (1984). In a case heard during the depths of the Great Depression, the Supreme 
Court declined to hold price fixing by a group of small coal producers as per se illegal.  
A cooperative enterprise, otherwise free from objection, which carries with it no 
monopolistic menace, is not to be condemned as an undue restraint merely 
because it may effect a change in market conditions, where the change would be 
in mitigation of recognized evils and would not impair, but rather foster, fair 
competitive opportunities. Voluntary action to rescue and preserve these 
opportunities, and thus to aid in relieving a depressed industry and in reviving 
commerce by placing competition upon a sounder basis, may be more efficacious 
than an attempt to provide remedies through legal processes. . . . Putting an end 
to injurious practices, and the consequent improvement of the competitive 
position of a group of producers, is not a less worthy aim and may be entirely 
consonant with the public interest, where the group must still meet effective 
competition in a fair market and neither seeks nor is able to effect a domination 
of prices. 
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 373–74 (1934)  
279. See generally Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
280. See id. at 344–45. 
281. Id. at 351. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. at 350–51. 
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The Court later articulated the standard by which private parties could 
qualify for the state action immunity. In California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc,284 the Court held that the activities of 
private parties were immune from antitrust challenge if they satisfied two 
conditions.285 The Court wrote that “first, the challenged restraint must be 
one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; second, 
the policy must be actively supervised by the State itself.”286 State-granted 
authority to act is not sufficient to satisfy the first prong; the 
anticompetitive outcome must be “the ‘foreseeable result’ of what the 
State authorized.”287 Active supervision means that a state entity reviewed 
the substance of the anticompetitive act and exercised the power to ratify 
or reject it.288 Unless both conditions are met, a private party is not entitled 
to state action immunity.  
In a 2015 decision, the Supreme Court further clarified the meaning 
of active supervision by the state. In North Carolina Board of State Dental 
Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission,289 the Court held that private 
actors had to be supervised by an independent state authority to qualify for 
the state action immunity.290 Supervision by a state agency “dominated by 
market participants” does not satisfy the active supervision requirement.291 
The majority wrote that such state agencies are indistinguishable from 
private trade associations and “pose the very risk of self-dealing [the 
active] supervision requirement was created to address.”292 As a result, for 
such agencies to claim state action immunity they must show that they are 
acting pursuant not only to clearly articulated state policy but also are 
subject to active supervision by the state.293 
States can use the state action doctrine to promote the growth of 
democratically accountable cooperatives. They can pass laws authorizing 
cooperatives to engage in collaborative activities and subject this joint 
conduct to active state supervision. By doing so, states can limit the 
application of federal antitrust laws to cooperatives. Because every state 
 
284. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 
(1980). 
285. Id. at 105. 
286. Id. 
287. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 217 
(2013). 
288. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992). 
289. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101 
(2015). 
290. Id. at 1113. 
291. Id. at 1116. 
292. Id. at 1114. 
293. See id. at 1113. 
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already has a statute for chartering cooperatives,294 states would 
principally have to work toward establishing regulatory oversight. This 
oversight could be provided through the executive branch, courts, or 
regulatory agencies, but importantly not through a state agency 
“dominated by market participants.”295 Provided they are acting pursuant 
to state authorization and supervision, cooperatives would have greater 
freedom to operate. While cooperatives would not enjoy legal carte 
blanche, they would be free to engage in joint action that may otherwise 
run afoul of the federal antitrust laws. For instance, a bargaining 
cooperative composed of small businesses would be immune from federal 
antitrust law so long as it acts pursuant to state authority and is actively 
supervised by a state agency. State law and regulation can account for the 
distinctive needs and objectives of cooperatives, which may not always 
conform to the prevailing strictures of antitrust law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When Congress saw fit, as Senator Capper put it, “to give to the 
farmer the same right to bargain collectively that is already enjoyed by 
corporations,”296 it affirmed the principle that distributed, competitive, and 
democratic activity ought to have a place in the economy alongside 
investor-owned corporations. The constituency most endangered by 
corporate power in 1922, and best organized to counter it, were farmers. 
For decades they formed cooperative enterprises as a means of 
counteracting the concentrated market power of bankers, suppliers, and 
railroads.297 The Capper-Volstead Act was a means of affirming the value 
of those cooperative enterprises, and the kind of business they enabled, by 
ensuring that antitrust law did not mistake cooperation between powerless 
actors for collusion among corporations.  
Today, the concerns that motivated Capper-Volstead have spread far 
beyond just farmers. Throughout the United States economy, especially in 
the emerging online economy, consolidation has become the norm. Small 
businesses face growing barriers to market entry and the growing ranks of 
independent workers find themselves at the mercy of the overwhelming 
market power of large corporations. As they did a century ago, people are 
now looking to cooperative ownership designs as a strategy for leveling 
the playing field with investor-owned corporations, but cooperative firms 
 
294. See, e.g., State Cooperative Statute Library, NAT’L COOPERATIVE BUS. ASSN. 
CLUSA INT’L, https://ncbaclusa.coop/resources/state-cooperative-statute-library/ (last 
visited Sep. 6, 2019). 
295. N.C. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 135 S. Ct. at 1116. 
296. 62 CONG. REC. 2057 (1922). 
297. See generally KNAPP, supra note 86. 
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can face undue barriers and inadequate recognition for their contributions 
to ensuring a diverse and democratic economy. 
In the context of the renewed interest in antitrust policy, the legacy 
and promise of cooperative enterprise deserves fresh consideration. 
Statutes such as the Clayton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act, along with 
various Supreme Court decisions, have secured a role for cooperatives in 
the United States antitrust tradition. That role should be no less significant 
in an age when online platforms are doing the work once done by railroads, 
when once again nascent kinds of natural-monopoly activity present both 
opportunities and dilemmas. The ambitions of Senator Capper and his 
bill’s supporters have economy-wide relevance and should not be limited 
to agriculture or any other subset of economic activity. Accordingly, 
antitrust law and policy should protect cooperation outside of agriculture 
alone. Genuine cooperative enterprise is something that should not only 
be tolerated but also encouraged. 
This Article proposes a series of interventions for how the spirit of 
Capper-Volstead might find new life today. First, Congress can extend the 
logic of that precedent to sectors outside of agriculture. Currently, when 
consolidation has spread to so many sectors, having such recognition 
limited to agriculture alone looks less like a considered choice than an 
accident of history. Second, courts can recognize the virtues of cooperative 
enterprise in their antitrust rulings and use such models as a tool for 
protecting beneficial economies of scale while retaining competition and 
diversity in markets. Third, federal agencies can distinguish between 
cooperation among the powerless and collusion among powerful 
corporations in their enforcement of antitrust law. Fourth, states can 
protect and supervise co-ops incorporated under their laws to ensure 
appropriately democratic practices and participation. Each of these 
recommendations calls for not just more generous treatment of 
cooperatives; it is equally necessary to revive a tradition of oversight to 
ensure that co-op businesses are, in fact, operating cooperatively and in 
the public interest. 
Antimonopoly proponents have already called for restoring a broader 
set of analytical and legal tools for understanding and restructuring 
monopolistic and oligopolistic markets. Consumer price is an insufficient 
measure of anticompetitive behavior when services can be delivered by 
monopolistic actors for free or very low cost in the short term—consider 
ridesharing, online search, and product delivery. Reformers are calling for 
antitrust to protect the public from the full economic and political power 
of corporations. Thus far, ownership design largely has been neglected in 
their proposals. While protections that farmers fought for a century ago 
may be discounted or dismissed in an era of big-box retail and online 
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networks, matters of ownership design have at least as much relevance 
today and should be a part of the antimonopoly arsenal. 
 
